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The field of constitutional law occupies a most peculiar place in the
American legal academy. By its very nature, it elevates form over substance by
treating constitutions differently from statutes and other sources of law, including
utilizing distinct interpretative methods, seemingly because they are labelled
constitutions.1 Courts and scholars typically justify this “constitutional law
exceptionalism” by emphasizing that a constitution establishes certain first
principles with respect to the structure of government and its relationship with its
people.2

* Past President, Virgin Islands Bar Association; Special Assistant to Hon. Rhys S. Hodge, Chief
Justice of the Virgin Islands; Practicing Faculty, St. Mary’s University School of Law. The views expressed
herein are solely my own and not those of the Judicial Branch of the Virgin Islands, the Virgin Islands Bar
Association, or any of their officers or employees.
1. See Christopher Serkin & Nelson Tebbe, Is the Constitution Special?, 101 CORNELL L. REV. 701
(2016).
2. See, e.g., Vanhorne's Lessee v. Dorrance, 2 U.S. 304, 308–09 (C.C.D. Pa. 1795); Frederick
Douglass, The Constitution of the United States: Is It Pro-Slavery or Anti-Slavery? (Mar. 26, 1860), in 2 THE
LIFE AND WRITINGS OF FREDERICK DOUGLASS 467, 468–69 (Philip S. Foner ed., 1950); David A. Strauss, Common
Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877, 877, 879 (1996); Christopher R. Green, “This
Constitution”: Constitutional Indexicals as a Basis for Textualist Semi-Originalism, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV.
1607, 1615–17 (2009).

2022

TERRITORIAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

207

If that is the case, the United States Constitution serves as a rather poor
example of a constitution, since “federal constitutional rights are primarily negative
in nature.”3 This, of course, is by design, since the Founders intended for the states
to remain distinct sovereign actors serving as an intermediary between the people
and the federal government and for state constitutions to confer positive or
affirmative rights to the people of their states.4 Yet if one were to review the
syllabus of a typical “Constitutional Law” course offered at an American law school
or read an issue of a constitutional law journal, one would likely believe that the
United States Constitution is the only constitution and that the Supreme Court of
the United States is the only court that issues decisions of a constitutional
magnitude.5
The past few decades have seen the growing emergence of a movement
described as “a state constitutional law renaissance” or a “new judicial
federalism.”6 The proponents of this approach recognize the importance of state
constitutions and believe that state courts should pay more than mere “lip service”
to long forgotten or overlooked state constitutional provisions and instead
interpret them to confer greater rights than those required by the United States
Constitution – even if the text of the state constitution is word-for-word identical.7
While scholars and jurists invoke case law, historical sources, and various
jurisprudential theories to support this approach, they also make no secret that
they believe state supreme courts should rely on state constitutions to insulate
their decisions from review and potential reversal by the Supreme Court of the
United States.8 In effect, state constitutions and the state courts interpreting them
serve as a check on the Supreme Court of the United States and the lower federal
courts by recognizing rights, liberties, and protections for the citizens of a state that

3. Robert F. Williams, The Brennan Lecture: Interpreting State Constitutions as Unique Legal
Documents, 27 OKLA. CITY U. L. REV. 189, 192 (2002).
4. See id. at 191–92; see also Burt Neuborne, Foreword: State Constitutions and the Evolution of
Positive Rights, 20 RUTGERS L.J. 881 (1989); Helen Hershkoff, Positive Rights and State Constitutions: The
Limits of Federal Rationality Review, 112 HARV. L. REV. 1131 (1999); Helen Hershkoff, Rights and Freedoms
Under the State Constitution: A New Deal for Welfare Rights, 13 TOURO L. REV. 631 (1997); Frank P. Grad,
The State Constitution: Its Function and Form for Our Time, 54 VA. L. REV. 928 (1968).
5. See Jeffrey S. Sutton, What Does—And Does Not—Ail State Constitutional Law, 59 U. KAN. L.
REV. 687, 687–89 (2011).
6. See, e.g., William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90
HARV. L. REV. 489, 491 (1977); Joseph Blocher, What State Constitutional Law Can Tell Us About the
Federal Constitution, 115 PA. ST. L. REV. 1035, 1037 (2011); JEFFREY S. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS:
STATES AND THE MAKING OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2018).
7. Thomas M. Hardiman, New Judicial Federalism and the Pennsylvania Experience: Reflections on
the Edmunds Decision, 47 DUQ. L. REV. 503, 505–07 (2009); see also Brennan, supra note 6, at 500–01;
SUTTON, supra note 6, at 8–10.
8. See, e.g., Hardiman, supra note 7, at 507.
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the federal courts are unwilling or unable to recognize nationally. 9 This constitutes
a radical departure from the once-common belief that federal courts are more likely
to safeguard such rights than state courts.10
But the United States consists of more than just the federal government
and the fifty states. Article IV of the United States Constitution recognizes that
territories are part of the United States as well.11 Yet the law of United States
territories has recently been described as an “emerging” area of the law.12 This
characterization is somewhat curious, in that territories have been part of our
nation since the Founding Era. Yet the territories and their laws have been absent
from mainstream legal scholarship, for largely different reasons. For the first 125
years of our constitutional republic, territorial status was generally accepted as a
temporary phase on a path to eventual statehood.13 However, the last 125 years
have seen the annexation of new territories consisting of largely non-white
populations geographically distant from the mainland United States, which remain
in territorial status indefinitely without a meaningful prospect of statehood.14
Nevertheless, the supreme laws defining the legal relationship between the
federal government and the territories of Puerto Rico, the U.S. Virgin Islands, Guam,
American Samoa, and the Northern Mariana Islands, as well as the significant
bodies of law developed by their jurists and attorneys, are largely “absent from the
canon of study of constitutional law in American legal education,” to a greater
extent than even state constitutional law.15 Like many Americans,16 members of
“the legal profession in the states [are] mostly unaware of the history and the
9. See Darryl K. Brown, The Warren Court, Criminal Procedure Reform, and Retributive
Punishment, 59 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 1411, 1422 (2002) (noting that the state constitutional law revolution
represented “[a] sustained, systemic reaction against” the jurisprudence of the United States Supreme
Court); see also Brennan, supra note 6, at 491; Hardiman, supra note 7, at 506.
10. See Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARV. L. REV. 1105, 1116–17 (1977) (recognizing
the widely-held assumption that “persons advancing federal constitutional claims against local officials
will fare better, as a rule, in a federal, rather than a state, trial court” and that “[f]ederal district courts
are institutionally preferable to state appellate courts as forums in which to raise federal constitutional
claims,” yet acknowledging that there are “no empirical studies that prove (or undermine) those
assumptions”).
11. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3.
12. See, e.g., Special Issue on the Law of the Territories, YALE L.J. (Mar. 23, 2021),
https://www.yalelawjournal.org/files/CallforPapersLawofTerritories_p6a17izo.pdf.
13. Harvard L. Rev. Ass’n, Chapter One, 130 HARV. L. REV. 1632, 1644–45 (2017).
14. Id.
15. Carlos Iván Gorrín Peralta, Past, Present, and Future of U.S. Territories: Expansion, Colonialism,
and Self-Determination, 46 STETSON L. REV. 233, 233 (2017); see also José A. Cabranes, Puerto Rico and
the Constitution, 110 F.R.D. 475, 477 (1986) (addressing the 1985 Judicial Conference of the First Circuit)
(citing William H. Rehnquist, Edward Douglass White Lecture, Louisiana State University (Mar 19, 1983)).
16. See, e.g., Kyle Dropp & Brendan Nyhan, Nearly Half of Americans Don’t Know Puerto Ricans
Are
Fellow
Citizens,
N.Y.
TIMES,
The
Upshot,
(Sept.
26,
2017)
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/26/upshot/nearly-half-of-americans-dont-know-people-in-puertoricoans-are-fellow-citizens.html.
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current relations between the United States and the territories.” 17 Those who do
know the territories often assume without basis that their legal systems are
unsophisticated,18 and discussions of territorial law are largely ignored and
dismissed by legal academia as “a marginal debate about marginal places.”19
It comes as no surprise, then, that legal scholarship examining state
constitutional law and judicial federalism largely ignores the five territories and
their constitutions and organic acts.20 In fact, a line of scholarship has developed
within the emerging field of the law of the territories advocating for a so-called
“territorial federalism”—a concept which, despite its name, has at its core the
premise that the territories cannot stand on their own, but require the active
intervention of the federal courts in their affairs; in other words, the opposite of
actual federalism.21
What is highly surprising, however, is that territorial governments and those
bringing public interest litigation on behalf of the people of territories have also
dismissed territorial courts and territorial constitutions in favor of their federal
counterparts, despite having many incentives not to do so. While territorial courts
possess concurrent jurisdiction over a wide array of matters such as voting rights,
much public interest litigation has been voluntarily filed in federal court rather than
territorial court, with claims brought under the United States Constitution and
federal statutes rather than pursuant to any territorial constitutional provisions. 22
This has been done even though territorial constitutions and organic acts, like state
constitutions, contain numerous provisions granting positive or affirmative rights;
several territorial courts have shown their receptiveness to expanding rights under

17. Peralta, supra note 15, at 233.
18. See, e.g., Kristen David Adams, The Folly of Uniformity? Lessons from the Restatement
Movement, 33 HOFSTRA L. REV. 423, 451 (2004) (describing the U.S. Virgin Islands as a “legal backwater”);
Arin Greenwood, My Clerkship in Paradise, FIRSTHAND, https://firsthand.co/blogs/job-search/myclerkship-in-paradise (Mar. 31, 2009) (discussing applying to clerk in the Northern Mariana Islands to
have “a restful year on a tropical island” and then being surprised that “the work is astonishingly
normal”).
19. Christina Duffy Burnett, A Convenient Constitution? Extraterritoriality After Boumediene, 109
COLUM. L. REV. 973, 1040–41 (2009).
20. Even the editors of venerable Harvard Law Review, in the very first sentence of a review of a
book on state constitutional law, incorrectly state that “[t]he American federal system contains not just
one constitution or just one supreme court, but fifty-one constitutions and fifty-one supreme courts
with the ultimate authority to interpret those constitutions.” Jeffrey S. Sutton, 51 Imperfect Solutions:
States and the Making of American Constitutional Law, 132 HARV. L. REV. 811, 811 (2018) (reviewing
JEFFREY S. SUTTON, 51 IMPERFECT SOLUTIONS: STATES AND THE MAKING OF AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW (2018)).
21. See Harvard L. Rev. Ass’n, supra note 13, at 1634; see also Russell Rennie, A Qualified Defense
of the Insular Cases, 92 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1683 (2017); Tom C.W. Lin, Americans, Almost and Forgotten, 107
CALIF. L. REV. 1249 (2019).
22. See, e.g., Ballentine v. United States, 486 F.3d 806, 811 (3d Cir. 2007); Igartua–De La Rosa v.
United States, 417 F.3d 145 (1st Cir. 2005).
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territorial constitutions; and a demonstrated unwillingness of many federal courts
to distinguish or overturn precedents hostile to territorial rights.23
This Article examines the nascent field of territorial constitutional law and its
critical importance in remedying inequality and maintaining territorial autonomy. 24
Part I provides an overview of the relationship between the federal government
and the territories, and briefly summarizes the structure of modern territorial
governments, including their constitutions and the relations between territorial and
federal courts. Part II considers the legal effect of territorial constitutions and
addresses the misconceptions that territorial courts somehow lack the authority to
definitively interpret territorial constitutions or that territorial constitutional law
cannot develop independently of federal constitutional law. 25 Part III examines
other challenges to the viability of territorial constitutional law, including the
seeming hesitancy of litigants who choose not to file territorial rights case in
territorial court, and highlights several cases in which territorial courts have
asserted their independence and embraced federalist principles vis-à-vis the
federal courts and compares the outcomes to similar cases brought in federal court
in the first instance. Finally, Part IV envisions the potential future of territorial
constitutional law, identifying several areas where territorial governments or their
people receive unequal treatment but which territorial courts are empowered to
remedy in appropriate cases through territorial constitutional law.

23. Compare Balboni v. Ranger Am. of the V.I., Inc., 70 V.I. 1048 (V.I. 2019); People v. Guerrero,
2000 Guam 26, with Ballentine, 486 F.3d 806; Igartua–De La Rosa, 417 F.3d 145.
24. As used in this Article, the phrase “territorial constitutional law” refers to the interpretation
of territorial constitutions and territorial organic acts by territorial courts or by federal courts predicting
how a territorial supreme court would interpret such a document. While it does not encompass
interpretation of the Territorial Clause of the United States Constitution or the applicability of certain
federal constitutional rights to the territories, such issues are nevertheless intrinsically interwoven with
the question of whether territorial constitutional law can exist as a free-standing field of the law in the
same manner as state constitutional law.
25. I acknowledge at the outset that some of the discussion in Parts I and II of this Article may
resemble legal scholarship from a bygone era, describing the current state of law akin to a treatise or
hornbook as opposed to presupposing a level of common knowledge. However, as should shortly
become apparent, the law of the territories is an area where “nothing can be assumed as common
knowledge or taken for granted.” Charles W. Collier, The Use and Abuse of Humanistic Theory in Law:
Reexamining the Assumptions of Interdisciplinary Legal Scholarship, 41 DUKE L.J. 191, 201 (1991).
Because the law of the territories has been “a strangely neglected field,” scholarship in the area remains
“sparse” and much of the scholarship that does exist is in a “confused state,” often relying on significant
misunderstandings of the law, leaving “many crucial questions unanswered,” or otherwise not written
in a manner suitable “to provid[ing] judges useful advice as to how to clean up the mess.” William F.
Fisher III, The Significance of Public Perception of the Takings Doctrine, 88 COLUM. L. REV. 1774, 1791
(1988).
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I. TERRITORIAL GOVERNANCE
A. The Insular Cases
At the end of the nineteenth century and the start of the twentieth century,
the United States became a colonial power. In 1898, the United States acquired
Guam, the Philippines, and Puerto Rico from Spain at the conclusion of the SpanishAmerican War.26 The following year, the islands comprising the Samoan archipelago
were partitioned between Germany and the United States, resulting in the transfer
of sovereignty over the islands of Tutuila and Aunu’u to the United States on April
17, 1900, which thereafter would collectively be known as American Samoa. 27
Shortly thereafter, in 1903, the United States acquired the Panama Canal Zone from
Panama through the Hay-Bunau-Varilla Treaty.28 And effective March 31, 1917, the
United States purchased from Denmark the islands of St. Croix, St. John, and St.
Thomas, as well as many surrounding minor islands, which collectively became the
U.S. Virgin Islands.29
Unlike other territories previously acquired by the United States in the late
eighteenth and early-to-mid nineteenth century, these new territories were both
non-contiguous with the mainland United States and had overwhelmingly nonwhite populations. Despite more than a century of congressional actions and
judicial precedents recognizing certain limitations on the power of Congress to
legislate for the territories, the legal academy, including prominent scholars of the
time such as Abbott Lawrence Lowell and Christopher Columbus Langdell, openly
advocated for separate and unequal treatment of the territories acquired after the
Spanish-American War based on conceptions of racial inferiority.30
Unfortunately, those efforts were successful. In a series of decisions
collectively known as the Insular Cases,31 the Supreme Court of the United States
26. Treaty of Paris, U.S.-Spain, Dec. 10, 1898, 30 Stat. 1754.
27. Instrument of Cession by the Chiefs of Tutuila Islands to United States Government, U.S.Tutuila, Apr. 17, 1900.
28. Panama Canal Treaties, 33 Stat. 2234.
29. Treaty for Cession of Danish West Indies, Aug. 4, 1916, U.S.-Den., 39 Stat. 1706.
30. See, e.g., C.C. Langdell, The Status of Our New Territories, 12 HARV. L. REV. 365 (1899); Simeon
E. Baldwin, The Constitutional Questions Incident to the Acquisition and Government by the United States
of Island Territory, 12 HARV. L. REV. 393 (1899); James Bradley Thayer, Our New Possessions, 12 HARV. L.
REV. 464 (1899); Abbott Lawrence Lowell, The Status of Our New Possessions—A Third View, 13 HARV. L.
REV. 155 (1899).
31. See Juan R. Torruella, Ruling America’s Colonies: The “Insular Cases”, 32 YALE L. & POL’Y REV.
57, 58 (2013). The Insular Cases typically refers to a series of six opinions issued by the Supreme Court
of the United States during its 1901 term, including De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901), Goetze v.
United States, 182 U.S. 221 (1901), Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222 (1901), Armstrong v. United
States, 182 U.S. 243 (1901), Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901), and Huus v. N.Y. & Porto Rico S.S.
Co., 182 U.S. 392 (1901). However, some jurists and scholars include additional cases within the Insular
Cases, such as The Diamond Rings, 183 U.S. 176 (1901), Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100 (1904),
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relied on these now-discredited theories of racial inequality and the white man’s
burden to interpret the Territorial Clause of the United States Constitution as
permitting Congress to treat the “savage,” “half-civilized,” “ignorant and lawless”
“alien races” inhabiting America’s territories in the Caribbean Sea and the Pacific
Ocean differently than white Americans in the states and mainland territories. 32 To
do so, the United States Supreme Court invented the doctrine of territorial
incorporation to draw distinctions between “incorporated” and “unincorporated”
territories,33 despite there being absolutely no textual, historical, or jurisprudential
basis for doing so.34
Today, any judge or lawyer who used the same racist rhetoric relied upon in
the Insular Cases would face professional discipline,35 and any law professor who
promoted such ideas in the classroom or through scholarship would be fired or
otherwise sanctioned.36
Consistent with the legal profession’s evolving views on race, the reasoning of
the Insular Cases has been repudiated by all corners of the legal community, to the
point where they have been described as having “nary a friend in the world.”37

Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138 (1904), and Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298 (1922). For purposes
of this Article, the term Insular Cases encompasses all cases decided by the Supreme Court of the United
States prior to the transition of the insular territories from direct federal control to democratically
elected local governments.
32. Downes, 182 U.S. at 287; Baldwin, supra note 30, at 415; Thayer, supra note 30, at 475.
33. Anthony Ciolli, The Power of United States Territories to Tax Interstate and Foreign Commerce:
Why the Commerce and Import-Export Clauses Do Not Apply, 63 TAX L. 1223, 1225 (2010) (“The concept
of incorporation was first proposed by Justice Edward White in his concurring opinion in Downes v.
Bidwell and later adopted by a majority of the Supreme Court in Dorr v. United States” and is premised
on the idea that “the United States Constitution would only apply in full force in a territorial possession
if Congress had somehow expressed an intent to incorporate the territory into the United States and to
provide its inhabitants with all of the rights guaranteed by the Constitution.”).
34. Gary Lawson & Robert D. Sloane, The Constitutionality of Decolonization by Associated
Statehood: Puerto Rico’s Legal Status Reconsidered, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1123, 1177 (2009) (“From the
standpoint of an originalist . . . The Insular Cases are, as Judge Torruella has aptly put it, ‘a strict
constructionist's worst nightmare.’ From the standpoint of one who views the Constitution in more
functional or normative terms . . . The Insular Cases look even worse.”)
35. See Model Rules of Pro. Conduct r. 8.4(g) (Am. Bar Ass’n 2021); Model Code of Jud. Conduct
r. 2.3 (Am. Bar Ass’n 2004).
36. See, e.g., UPenn Law Professor Removed for Calling Black Students Inferior, N.Y. POST (Mar.
15, 2018), https://nypost.com/2018/03/15/upenn-law-professor-removed-for-calling-black-studentsinferior/; Brian Dakss, Georgetown Law Professor Fired Over Remarks About Black Students That a Dean
Called
“Abhorrent”
and
“Reprehensible,”
CBS
NEWS
(Mar.
12,
2021),
https://www.cbsnews.com/news/georgetown-law-professor-fired-over-remarks-about-blackstudents-that-a-dean-called-abhorrent-and-reprehensible/.
37. Luis Fuentes-Rohwer, The Land That Democratic Theory Forgot, 83 IND. L.J. 1525, 1536 (2008).

2022

TERRITORIAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

213

But although rhetoric has changed, perceptions of the law have not.38 The
Supreme Court of the United States has cautioned that “[n]either the [Insular Cases]
nor their reasoning should be given any further expansion,”39 and expressly
reconceptualized the Insular Cases as holding “that the Constitution has
independent force in these territories, a force not contingent upon acts of
legislative grace.”40 Yet at the same time, the United States Supreme Court has
never formally overturned the Insular Cases, despite receiving several invitations to
do so.41 In fact, judges, lawyers, and presidential administrations of all parts of the
ideological and political spectrum continue to cite to the Insular Cases as grounds
for treating certain American territories less favorably.42 And despite its admonition
that the Insular Cases not be given any further expansion, the Supreme Court of the
United States has repeatedly denied certiorari in cases where lower federal courts
relied on the Insular Cases to withhold important rights such as citizenship and
freedom from unreasonable warrantless searches. 43 While their racist reasoning
may have been disavowed, the Insular Cases thus nevertheless hover as a specter
over the territories and continue to serve as a justification for treating some
Americans differently from other Americans based on the part of the United States
they call home. 44

38. As shall be examined in greater detail in Part II, infra, the conventional wisdom that the Insular
Cases conclusively held that the United States Constitution does not fully apply to unincorporated
territories is simply incorrect. “[W]hile the Insular Cases unquestionably distinguished between
unincorporated and incorporated territories, the difference between these territories with respect to
the application of constitutional provisions has never been as great as courts and commentators have
argued.” Burnett, supra note 19, at 984. Significantly, although the reasoning used to support the Insular
Cases is abhorrent and cannot be reconciled with modern theories of constitutional interpretation, the
ultimate results of the individual cases encompassing the Insular Cases are fully consistent with—and
often support—principles of territorial autonomy and self-governance, including the authority of
territorial courts to develop territorial constitutional law independently of the federal courts and the
federal constitution. See discussion infra Part III.
39. Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 14 (1957).
40. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 757 (2008).
41. See Financial Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R. v. Aurelius Investment, LLC, 140 S. Ct. 1649, 1665
(2020). Most recently, the United States Supreme Court expressly declined to consider a request from
the Virgin Islands Bar Association and other amicus curiae to “overrule the much-criticized ‘Insular Cases’
and their progeny,” although it again reiterated that “whatever their continued validity we will not
extend them in these cases.” Id.
42. See generally Adriel I. Cepeda Derieux & Neil C. Weare, After Aurelius: What Future for the
Insular Cases?, 130 YALE L.J.F. 284, 284–85 (2020) (providing examples of judges, lawyers, and
presidential administrations using the Insular Cases to treat territories less favorably).
43. See, e.g., Baxter v. United States, 141 S. Ct. 1269 (2021); Tuaua v. United States, 136 S. Ct.
2461 (2016).
44. Derieux & Weare, supra note 42.
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B. Development of Territorial Constitutions and Legal Institutions
If one’s only familiarity with the territories were the Insular Cases and the
limited scholarly commentary on them, one may wrongly assume that American
Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin
Islands are mere “colonies” that may exercise only “limited, local self-governance”
but are otherwise under the direct day-to-day control of the federal government. 45
It is of course true that at the time the Insular Cases were decided, Puerto Rico,
Guam, and American Samoa were either under military rule or administered by
non-indigenous civilian governors who were appointed by the President of the
United States.46 This was also the case with the U.S. Virgin Islands after its
annexation in 1916,47 and while certain reforms were adopted—such as elected
territorial legislatures—all four of those territories remained under the control of
presidentially-appointed governors through the 1950s and 1960s. 48
Scholars have written entire books on the developmental history of territorial
governments, and this Article cannot do justice to the many important events on
the road to autonomy that occurred in these territories over the course of the past
century.49 But while territorial governments may have only exercised “limited”
power in the past, this is certainly no longer the case today. Puerto Rico became
self-governing in 1952 with the ratification of the Constitution of Puerto Rico, which
provided for a locally-elected governor, locally-elected legislature, and a judicial
branch consisting of local judges appointed by the governor with the advice and
consent of the Puerto Rican Senate. 50 American Samoa also achieved nearly
equivalent local control over its internal affairs upon the adoption of the
Constitution of American Samoa in 1967, which provided for a locally-elected
governor, a locally-elected legislature, and a judicial branch whose judges are
mostly appointed by the governor.51 The U.S. Virgin Islands and Guam achieved selfgovernance in a more piecemeal fashion, with a locally-elected legislature
authorized, respectively, in 1936 and 1950, a locally-elected governor granted in
1968, and a completely locally-appointed judicial branch authorized in 1984;
although, the territories chose not to establish the local supreme courts so
authorized until later.52 And the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands
has always been self-governing, having voluntarily joined the United States as a

45. See Lin, supra note 21, at 1265.
46. See Jon M. Van Dyke, The Evolving Legal Relationships Between the United States and Its
Affiliated U.S.-Flag Islands, 14 U. HAW. L. REV. 445, 472–93 (1992).
47. Id. at 494–96.
48. Id. at 472–96.
49. See, e.g., WILLIAM W. BOYER, AMERICA’S VIRGIN ISLANDS: A HISTORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND WRONGS
(2d ed. 2010); JUAN R. TORRUELLA, THE SUPREME COURT AND PUERTO RICO (1985).
50. Van Dyke, supra note 46, at 472–73.
51. Tuaua v. United States, 951 F. Supp. 2d 88, 90 (D.D.C. 2013).
52. See In re Camacho, 2004 Guam 10 para. 28–30 (2004); Jackson v. West Indian Co., 944 F. Supp.
423, 429 (D.V.I. 1996).
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territory in 1986 with a constitution authorizing a locally-elected governor, a locallyelected legislature, and a locally-appointed judicial branch.53
The modern-day territorial governments of American Samoa, Guam,
Puerto Rico, the Northern Mariana Islands, and the U.S. Virgin Islands are in virtually
every way the equivalent of a state government. Their territorial governors
exercise the same powers with the same limitations as their counterparts in the
fifty states.54 Their territorial legislatures may legislate on any subject that a state
legislature would be permitted to do so.55 The territorial judicial branches exercise
the same jurisdiction as a state court system and are treated by the federal courts
as if they were state courts, including application of the Erie doctrine, RookerFeldman abstention, and other limitations on the power of the federal courts vis-àvis the state courts.56 But perhaps most importantly, all three branches of the
territorial governments are ultimately accountable to the people of the territory,
just as all branches of a state government answer to the people of their state. For
all intents and purposes, the governments of American Samoa, Guam, Puerto Rico,
the Northern Mariana Islands, and the U.S. Virgin Islands are largely
indistinguishable from the governments of the fifty states.57
Nevertheless, some dismiss the powers exercised by territorial governments
and the rights enjoyed by their people as a mere “legislative grace” which Congress
has granted these territories and could theoretically repeal,58 with some outright
stating that Congress could “abolish the institutions of local self-government
altogether and reestablish a colonial regime.” 59 While it is readily acknowledged
that “[t]here is no reason . . . to anticipate that the United States would take these
or comparable steps—and strong reasons to think that it would not,”60 many
continue to believe that the Insular Cases permit Congress to simply erase all
territorial legal institutions—including territorial constitutions—and wipe the slate
clean. As the following section shall explain, this is not actually the case, and is
53. See United States ex rel. Richards v. De Leon Guerrero, 4 F.3d 749, 751–52 (9th Cir. 1993).
54. See Virgin Islands Revised Organic Act of 1954 48 U.S.C. §§ 1541–1645; Guam Organic Act 48
U.S.C. §§ 1421–28e; P.R. CONST.; AM. SAM. CONST.; N. MAR. I. CONST.
55. 48 U.S.C. §§ 1541–1645, 1421–28e; P.R. CONST.; AM. SAM. CONST.; N. MAR. I. CONST.
56. See, e.g., MRL Dev. I, LLC v. Whitecap Inv. Corp., 823 F.3d 195, 201–02 (3d Cir. 2016); Davison
v. Gov’t of P.R.-P.R. Firefighters Corps, 471 F.3d 220, 223 (1st Cir. 2006).
57. One noticeable difference from the typical structure of a state government is present in
American Samoa, where the Constitution of American Samoa provides for the United States Secretary
of the Interior to appoint the Chief Justice of American Samoa and the Associate Justices of the High
Court of American Samoa. However, the role of the Secretary of Interior in the appointment of American
Samoa’s judicial officers is expressly provided for in the Constitution of American Samoa, which was
adopted by a local constitutional convention and approved by popular referendum. AM. SAM. CONST. art.
III § 3. As such, the people of American Samoa have made a conscious decision for their Judicial Branch
to be completely independent of the Executive and Legislative Branches.
58. See, e.g., Stephen I. Vladeck, Military Courts and Article III, 103 GEO. L.J. 933, 981 (2015).
59. Gary Lawson & Robert D. Sloane, The Constitutionality of Decolonization by Associated
Statehood: Puerto Rico’s Legal Status Reconsidered, 50 B.C. L. REV. 1123, 1183 (2009).
60. Id. at 1184.
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based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the Insular Cases and the Territorial
Clause.
II. THE LEGAL EFFECT OF TERRITORIAL CONSTITUTIONS
This Article began by acknowledging that for centuries scholars and jurists
generally recognized a constitution as the supreme law of the land, establishing
certain first principles with respect to the structure of government and its
relationship with its people. 61 While the United States Constitution largely meets
this definition, it intentionally frames the rights of the people using negative rather
than positive language, with the understanding that state constitutions would serve
as the primary source of such affirmative rights.62 While the Supremacy Clause of
the United States Constitution provides for the federal constitution and federal
statutes to take precedence over these state constitutions,63 it remains generally
accepted that state constitutions constitute the supreme law of their respective
states in all areas not preempted by federal law, with even the Supreme Court of
the United States powerless to reverse the judgment of a state supreme court if the
decision was based on an independent interpretation of a state constitutional
provision or other state law.64 The United States Supreme Court succinctly
explained:
The reason is so obvious that it has rarely been thought to warrant
statement. It is found in the partitioning of power between the state
and Federal judicial systems and in the limitations of our own
jurisdiction. Our only power over state judgments is to correct them to
the extent that they incorrectly adjudge federal rights. And our power
is to correct wrong judgments, not to revise opinions. We are not
permitted to render an advisory opinion, and if the same judgment
would be rendered by the state court after we corrected its views of
Federal laws, our review could amount to nothing more than an
advisory opinion.65
Thus, the limitation on the power of the Supreme Court of the United States
to review the correctness of state courts’ interpretations of their own state
constitutions appears predicated on the federalist principles inherent in the
structural provisions of the United States Constitution.66

61. See supra references and text accompanying note 2.
62. See supra references accompanying note 4.
63. U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2.
64. See, e.g., Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. 590, 609 (1874); Black v. Cutter Lab’ys, 351 U.S.
292, 298 (1956); Wilson v. Loew’s, Inc., 355 U.S. 597, 598 (1958).
65. Herb v. Pitcairn, 324 U.S. 117, 125–26 (1945).
66. See Marcia L. McCormick, When Worlds Collide: Federal Construction of State Institutional
Competence, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 1167, 1203 (2007).
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What, then, is the legal effect of territorial constitutions and organic acts?
Over the past several decades, “the U.S. territories have moved toward mimicking
the federal-state relationship” in a way that has resulted in “the devolution of
power from D.C. to the territorial capitals,” to the point where today the territories
operate under a “form of functional territorial federalism that has flourished
outside the traditional mold’s formal legal limits.” 67 As explained earlier, today the
territorial governments of American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands,
Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands are indistinguishable in virtually every
respect from the governments of the fifty states.68 Yet it remains generally accepted
that unlike state governments, these territorial governments do not exercise any
sovereign authority separate and apart from that of the federal government. 69
Can it really be the case that such territorial constitutions are constitutions in
name only, and that the idea that territorial supreme courts may develop their own
territorial constitutional law to provide greater protections than the United States
Constitution, without the inference of the federal courts, is merely illusory? To
answer this question, it is critically important to first examine the federal
constitutional underpinnings of territorial governments, as determined by the
Supreme Court of the United States in the Insular Cases and other precedents. For
the reasons set forth in the following sections, neither the Insular Cases themselves
nor any abstract notions of sovereignty or congressional power preclude any of the
territories from developing a robust and binding canon of territorial constitutional
law.
A. Misconceptions of the Insular Cases
Much modern scholarship on the Insular Cases focuses on their abhorrent
reasoning, and in particular the express reliance on theories of white supremacy
and racial inferiority while completely ignoring prior judicial precedents, historical
sources, and the plain text of the United States Constitution. However, it is
important to remember that the Insular Cases were not a single decision, but rather
a set of decisions in different cases raising distinct legal questions that were decided
over the course of multiple decades.70 The result of collectively grouping these
otherwise-unrelated decisions is that scholars have paid comparatively little
attention to the individual cases themselves, including the specific legal questions
raised in those cases. Rather, legal scholarship has reframed the Insular Cases as
collectively answering a significant question of first principles—“Does the
Constitution follow the flag?”—in the negative.71
67. Harvard L. Rev. Ass’n, supra note 13, , at 1634.
68. See supra references and text accompanying notes 54–57.
69. Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 579 U.S. 59, 68–72 (2016).
70. See Krishanti Vignarajah, The Political Roots of Judicial Legitimacy: Explaining the Enduring
Validity of the Insular Cases, 77 U. CHI. L. REV. 781, 784 (2010).
71. See, e.g., Joseph E. Sung, Redressing the Legal Stigmatization of American Samoans, 89 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1309, 1319–20 (2016); Pedro A. Malavet, The Inconvenience of a “Constitution [That] Follows the
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In recent years, some scholars have recognized that the “traditional story”
that the Insular Cases “h[eld] that the U.S. Constitution did not ‘follow the flag’ to
the recently annexed possessions in the Pacific Ocean and the Caribbean Sea” is a
gross mischaracterization of what those decisions actually held and is
“fundamentally wrong.”72 The conventional wisdom that the Insular Cases stand for
the proposition that the United States Constitution does not apply to the territories
has even been expressly rejected by the Supreme Court of the United States, which
recently emphasized that the Insular Cases actually adopted the opposite holding:
“that the Constitution has independent force in these territories, a force not
contingent upon acts of legislative grace.” 73
One may wonder, if the Insular Cases never held that the United States
Constitution does not follow the flag, why so many scholars and others believe that
they did. A substantial part of the misconception certainly stems from what the
Insular Cases clearly did: permit Congress to draw distinctions between
“incorporated” and “unincorporated” territories based on a belief that the
“savage,” “half-civilized,” “ignorant and lawless” “alien races” inhabiting the socalled “unincorporated” territories warranted different treatment than white
Americans in the states and the so-called “incorporated” territories.74
But what did this differential treatment entail? Contrary to popular belief, the
questions raised in many of the decisions comprising the Insular Cases were not of
a constitutional magnitude. Rather, they involved relatively mundane questions of
statutory interpretation, such as whether Puerto Rico and the then-Territory of the
Philippines were a “foreign country” for purposes of tariff laws;75 whether customs
duties applied to imports from Puerto Rico; 76 whether vessels traveling between
Puerto Rico and New York were engaged in trade for purpose of federal maritime
laws;77 and whether residents of Puerto Rico qualified as “aliens” under a federal
immigration statute.78 Significantly, such cases typically expressly avoided deciding
constitutional questions—such as the citizenship status of the inhabitants of Puerto
Rico—in favor of resolving the issue presented as a pure matter of statutory
interpretation.79
Flag . . . But Doesn’t Quite Catch Up With It”: From Downes v. Bidwell to Boumediene v. Bush, 80 MISS.
L.J. 181, 185–86 (2010).
72. Christina Duffy Burnett, Untied States: American Expansion and Territorial Deannexation, 72
U. CHI. L. REV. 797, 797 (2005); see also Gary Lawson, Territorial Governments and the Limits of
Formalism, 78 CALIF. 853, 875–76 (1990) (noting “the full and immediate application of the Constitution
in incorporated territories is at odds with” numerous precedents, including that territorial courts need
not satisfy the structural requirements of Article III).
73. Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 757 (2008).
74. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 287 (1901).
75. De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1, 174 (1901); The Diamond Rings, 183 U.S. 176, 177 (1901).
76. Downes, 182 U.S. at 245; Armstrong v. United States, 182 U.S. 243 (1901); Dooley v. United
States, 182 U.S. 222 (1901); Goetze v. United States, 182 U.S. 221 (1901).
77. Huus v. N.Y. & Porto Rico Steamship Co., 182 U.S. 392 (1901).
78. Gonzales v. Williams, 192 U.S. 1, 7 (1904).
79. See, e.g., id. at 12, 16.
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Of course, some of the Insular Cases did directly implicate federal
constitutional issues. These include decisions holding that the then-Territory of
Hawaii could prosecute a criminal defendant in its local courts by information
without an indictment by a grand jury;80 that Puerto Rico and the Philippines could
withhold a trial by jury in criminal cases tried in their local courts;81 that the
territorial appellate courts of the Philippines could reverse an acquittal and order a
conviction;82 and that the federal government could not try a federal criminal
defendant in the then-Territory of Alaska for a violation of a crime against the
United States before a six-person jury rather than a twelve-person jury.83
A cursory reading of the summaries of these holdings certainly supports
the proposition that the Supreme Court of the United States held that some
provisions of the federal Bill of the Rights did not apply to the territories. However,
it is well-established that “[t]he simple words of the opinions . . . are not as
important as the contexts in which those cases were decided,” 84 and that “the
precedential value of a decision is defined by the context of the case from which it
arose.”85 While it is technically true that the United States Supreme Court held, for
instance, that criminal defendants tried in the local courts of Puerto Rico were not
entitled to a trial by jury, it would be gravely wrong to infer from that naked holding,
divorced from any legal or historical context, that the Court held that the relevant
portions of the United States Constitution do not apply to the territories.
The United States Constitution divides powers between several distinct
entities—the United States and the states—and further divides the power of the
United States into three separate branches of government who exercise the
sovereign power of the United States in different ways. This division of power is
reflected in the structure of the United States Constitution itself, in that Article I is
captioned “The Legislative Branch,” Article II is titled “The Presidency,” Article III is
labelled “The Judiciary,” while Article IV is called “The States.” As such, the United
States Constitution contains numerous provisions directed specifically to each of
these four actors without mentioning the others. For example, the United States
Constitution provides that Congress may coin money and establish post offices,86
that the President serves as the commander-in-chief of the military,87 that the
federal courts adjudicate cases and controversies;88 and that the states give full
faith and credit to acts, records, and judicial proceedings of every other state. 89
However, it would be frivolous to say that the entire United States Constitution
does not apply to the states because only Congress has the power to coin money,
80. Hawaii v. Mankichi, 190 U.S. 197, 217–18 (1903).
81. Balzac v. Porto Rico, 258 U.S. 298, 313 (1922); Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 149 (1904).
82. Trono v. United States, 199 U.S. 521, 534–35 (1905).
83. Rasmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516, 528 (1905).
84. King v. Morton, 520 F.2d 1140, 1147 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
85. UC Health v. N.L.R.B., 803 F.3d 669, 683 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Edwards, J., concurring).
86. U.S. CONST. art. I § 8.
87. Id. art. II § 2.
88. Id. art. III § 1.
89. Id. art. IV § 1.
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or that the entire Constitution does not apply to Congress because only the
President serves as commander-in-chief. Rather, these omissions simply reflect that
the United States Constitution establishes a federalist form of government which
allocates powers between the United States government and the states, and then
further provides for a separation of powers amongst the three branches
constituting the United States government.
Like Articles I through IV of the United States Constitution, some provisions of
the Bill of Rights contain language directed towards certain actors. For example, the
First Amendment states that “Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion.” 90 Other provisions, however, do not expressly mention
the states or a branch of the federal government and are written in the passive
voice, such as Second Amendment which provides that the right to bear arms “shall
not be infringed”91 or the Fourth Amendment stating that the right to be free from
unreasonable searches and seizures “shall not be violated.”92
One highly overlooked—yet exceptionally important—aspect of
contextualizing the Insular Cases is the application of the federal Bill of Rights to the
states at the time the Insular Cases were decided. Today, it is largely taken for
granted that the Fourteenth Amendment has incorporated virtually all provisions
of the Bill of Rights of the United States Constitution against the fifty states.
It is easy to forget, however, that the incorporation of the Bill of Rights against
the states is a relatively recent development in American jurisprudence. In 1833,
the Supreme Court of the United States unanimously held in Barron v. Baltimore
that the Bill of Rights did not apply to the states, and that the protections set forth
in the Bill of Rights could only be provided in state constitutions. 93 To reach this
decision, Chief Justice John Marshall expressly relied on the fact that the plain text
of the United States Constitution contained no dictatory language towards the
states.94 In 1868, the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed the holding of Barron
even though the Fourteenth Amendment had been ratified several months earlier,
holding that the Fifth and Sixth Amendments did not apply to criminal prosecutions
in the courts of Pennsylvania or other states because they were intended only to
limit federal power.95
Four decades later, in the Slaughter-House Cases, the United States Supreme
Court again reaffirmed the core holding of Barron. 96 Although it recognized that the
plain text of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment
provides that “[n]o State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States,”97 a majority of the United
States Supreme Court interpreted this language exceptionally narrowly, so that
90. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
91. Id. amend. II.
92. Id. amend. IV.
93. Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243, 250–51 (1833).
94. Id. at 248.
95. Twitchell v. Pennsylvania, 74 U.S. 321 (1868).
96. The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
97. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2.
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states were only prohibited from interfering with those rights that “owe their
existence to the Federal government,” such as traveling to the seat of government,
free access to seaports, transacting business with the government, and the privilege
of habeas corpus.98 This interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment effectively
rendered it “a vain and idle enactment, which accomplished nothing.”99 The United
States Supreme Court thereafter expressly held in subsequent cases that the First,
Second, and Fifth Amendments did not apply to state governments pursuant to the
interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment adopted in the Slaughter-House
Cases.100
Barron, the Slaughter-House Cases, and their progeny remained binding
precedent throughout the entire two-decade period from 1901 to 1922 in which all
the Insular Cases were decided. Moreover, throughout this period the United States
Supreme Court and the lower federal courts issued numerous additional decisions
expressly holding that various provisions of the Bill of Rights did not apply to the
states. For instance, in 1908, the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed its earlier
holding that the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination did not apply in
cases brought in the New Jersey court system and in other state courts. 101
The United States Supreme Court did not retreat from its steadfast refusal to
apply the Bill of Rights against the states until it issued its seminal decision in Gitlow
v. New York in 1925, which extended the rights of freedom of speech and freedom
of the press codified in the First Amendment to state governments, in effect
overruling Barron and other contrary cases. 102 Over the next several decades, the
United States Supreme Court would issue decisions incorporating the remainder of
the First Amendment103 as well as the Second,104 Fourth,105 and Eighth
Amendments,106 as well as portions of the Fifth107 and Sixth Amendments.108
98.The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. at 79.
99. Id. at 96 (Field, J., dissenting).
100. See Kelly v. City of Pittsburgh, 104 U.S. 78 (1881); United States v. Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542
(1875).
101. Twining v. New Jersey, 211 U.S. 78 (1908).
102. Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925).
103. See Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963) (right to petition); Everson v. Bd. of Educ.,
330 U.S. 1 (1947) (establishment of religion); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (free exercise
of religion); DeJonge v. Oregon, 299 U.S. 353 (1937) (freedom of assembly).
104. McDonald v. City of Chicago, 561 U.S. 742 (2010).
105. See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961) (unreasonable searches and seizures); Aguilar v.
Texas, 378 U.S. 108 (1964) (warrant requirement).
106. See Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S.Ct. 682 (2019) (excessive fines); Schib v. Kuebel, 404 U.S. 357
(1971) (excessive bail); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) (cruel and unusual punishment).
107. See Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (double jeopardy); Griffin v. California, 380 U.S.
609 (1965) (self-incrimination in court); Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966) (self-incrimination out
of court).
108. See Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213 (1967) (speedy trial); In re Oliver, 333 U.S. 257
(1948) (public trial); Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968) (impartial jury); Ramos v. Louisiana, 140
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With this context in mind, the prevailing conception of the legal impact of
the Insular Cases—as opposed to their political or social impacts—is simply wrong.
The Insular Cases did not treat residents of the territories differently than residents
of the states with respect to the constitutional protections of the Bill of Rights.
Although a criminal defendant tried in the local territorial courts of Puerto Rico did
not have a federal constitutional right to trial by jury, neither did a criminal
defendant tried in the courts of New Jersey or any other state. While the Territory
of Hawaii could initiate a criminal prosecution by information instead of by grand
jury indictment, so could Pennsylvania and other states—in fact, even today the
Grand Jury Clause of the Fifth Amendment remains unincorporated to the states.109
Rather than treating the territories differently from the states, the Insular Cases
provided equal treatment, in that people of the territories were denied the
protections of the Bill of Rights by the federal government on the same basis as the
people of the states.110
B. Sovereignty and Congressional Power
It is clear, then, that modern scholars and courts’ conception of the
holdings of those cases is distorted through the lens of modern case law applying
the Bill of Rights to the states. This, of course, raises another question. If it was
established black-letter law from 1833 to 1925 that the Bill of Rights did not apply
to state governments, why was it even an open question as to whether the Bill of
Rights applied to territorial governments? After all, if the federal constitutional right
to a trial by jury did not apply to prosecutions in state courts, what possible
justification would there be to have such a right apply to territorial prosecutions,
and in effect provide the residents of the territories with greater minimum
constitutional rights than residents of the states?
The arguments in support of applying the Bill of Rights to territorial
governments revolved around questions of the nature of congressional power over
the territories. Prior to the Insular Cases, it had already been well-established that
territorial governments lacked separate sovereignty over their lands, and that such
S. Ct. 1390 (2020) (unanimous jury); Pointer v. Texas, 380 U.S. 400 (1965) (right to confront witnesses);
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) (compulsory process); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963) (assistance of counsel).
109. See Fields v. Soloff, 920 F.2d 1114 (2d Cir. 1990).
110. One scholar has recently set forth a purported “qualified defense” of the Insular Cases, and
in effect arguing that the ultimate result of the Insular Cases “is not merely defensible but perhaps even
necessary” to allow the people of the territories to govern themselves and protect their cultures.
Rennie, supra note 21. I emphasize, in the strongest terms possible, that I do not subscribe to this view.
Even if one were to overlook the racist reasoning of the Insular Cases as a product of those times and
focus only on the ultimate result, the Supreme Court of the United States accomplished that equal
treatment by withholding constitutional rights from both the people of the territories and the states.
While it is necessary and important to correct the misconception that the Insular Cases endorsed
differential constitutional treatment of territories relative to the states, this is necessary only due to the
continued invocation of the Insular Cases to justify continued differential treatment.
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sovereignty instead belonged to Congress. The constitutional authority for this rule
stems from the Territorial Clause, which provides that
[t]he Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful
Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property
belonging to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be
so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or of any
particular State.111
At first, the Supreme Court of the United States appeared to interpret the
phrase “Territory or other Property” to “impl[y] that ‘Territory’ is to be considered
as property” and that “Congress would deal with it as representing the owner,
rather than the sovereign.”112 The Court, however, would shortly thereafter retreat
from its characterization of the territories as mere property or lands with Congress
serving as the owner, and instead reconceptualize the Territorial Clause as
authorizing Congress to act as a sovereign. To that end, the United States Supreme
Court recognized in Benner v. Porter that Congress possessed the authority to
establish territorial governments under the Territorial Clause, which it described as
follows:
[Territorial governments] are legislative governments, and their courts
legislative courts, Congress, in the exercise of its powers in the
organization and government of the territories, combining the powers
of both the Federal and State authorities. There is but one system of
government, or of laws operating within their limits, as neither is
subject to the constitutional provisions in respect to State and Federal
jurisdiction. They are not organized under the Constitution, nor subject
to its complex distribution of the powers of government, as the organic
law; but are the creations, exclusively, of the legislative department,
and subject to its supervision and control.113
The Benner court, however, declined to consider at that time “[w]hether or
not there are provisions in that instrument which extend to and act upon these
territorial governments,” deeming it not material to the issue of statutory
interpretation before it.114
This characterization of Congress as possessing the combined “powers of
both the Federal and State authorities” raised serious issues about the precise
nature of this power. From 1833 to 1925, the Supreme Court of the United States
had repeatedly held that the Bill of Rights only placed limits on “federal power” and

111. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
112. See Baldwin, supra note 30, at 394 (citing United States v. Gratiot, 14 Peters, 526, 527
(1840)).
113. 9 Howard 235, 242 (1850).
114. Id.
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thus did not constrain state governments.115 The constitutional question implicated
in the Insular Cases, then, was whether Congress, when exercising the “powers of
both the Federal and State authorities” to enact legislation in a territory, exercised
a “federal power” so as to constrain that legislation by the Bill of Rights under
Barron and its progeny.
Of course, the Supreme Court of the United States resolved this question
in the Insular Cases by drawing a distinction between so-called incorporated and
unincorporated territories. In doing so, however, it is critically important to
recognize that the United States Supreme Court did not address a question of
sovereignty.116 After all, it had already been established decades ago that territorial
governments lacked separate sovereignty, with that principle being reaffirmed by
the United States Supreme Court as late as two years before the first of the Insular
Cases was decided,117 with none of the Insular Cases providing any support for the
proposition that incorporated territories possessed some form of sovereignty that
unincorporated territories did not.118 It was beyond dispute that Congress had the
power under the Territorial Clause to legislate for both incorporated and
unincorporated territories; what was certainly in dispute, however, was whether
Congress exercised a “federal power” every single time it did so with respect to
every territory.
The Insular Cases answered this question in the negative, holding in effect
that Congress exercises the power of a state, and not a federal power, when it
enacts legislation directed towards a territory.119 In doing so, the United States
Supreme Court relied on earlier precedents pertaining to congressional authority
over the District of Columbia, in which it had previously held that Congress acts in
a “double capacity” with respect to the federal district: “in one as legislating for the
states; in the other as a local legislature for the District of Columbia,” and when
exercising the latter power could enact any law or levy any tax that would be within
the power of a state legislature to enact.120 In another case, the United States
Supreme Court relied on a treatise that analogized the relationship between
Congress and a territory to that of a state and a municipality:
It is no doubt most consistent with the general theory of republican
institutions that the people everywhere should be allowed selfgovernment; but it has never been deemed a matter of right that a local
115. Twitchell v. Pennsylvania, 74 U.S. 321, 323 (1868); see also Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. 243,
248–49 (1833).
116. See De Lima v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 1 (1901); Goetze v. United States, 182 U.S. 221 (1901);
Dooley v. United States, 182 U.S. 222 (1901); Armstrong v. United States, 182 U.S. 243 (1901); Downes
v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244 (1901); Huus v. New York & Porto Rico Steamship Co., 182 U.S. 392 (1901).
117. Simms v. Simms, 175 U.S. 162, 168 (1899).
118. See De Lima, 182 U.S. 1; Goetze, 182 U.S. 221; Dooley, 182 U.S. 222; Armstrong, 182 U.S.
243; Downes, 182 U.S. 244; Huus, 182 U.S. 392.
119. See De Lima, 182 U.S. 1; Goetze, 182 U.S. 221; Dooley, 182 U.S. 222; Armstrong, 182 U.S.
243; Downes, 182 U.S. 244; Huus, 182 U.S. 392.
120. Downes, 182 U.S. at 259–60 (citing Loughborough v. Blake, 5 Wheat. 317 (1820)).
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community should be suffered to lay the foundations of institutions,
and erect a structure of government thereon, without the guidance and
restraint of a superior authority. Even in the older states, where society
is most homogeneous and has fewest of the elements of disquiet and
disorder, the state reserves to itself the right to shape municipal
institutions; and towns and cities are only formed under its directions,
and according to the rules and within the limits the state prescribes.
With still less reason could the settlers in new territories be suffered to
exercise sovereign powers.121
Thus, when exercising the power to establish a system of government for a
territory, Congress does not exercise the federal power it uses to enact national
legislation; rather, it exercises a different power, the same power utilized by the
states to establish their own laws and governmental institutions. Consequently,
since state governments—at the time the Insular Cases were decided—were not
bound by the Bill of Rights and could in their discretion elect to deny rights such as
the right to trial by jury; Congress, when serving as a stand-in for a state legislature
or the people of a state, could similarly exercise its discretion to withhold those
same rights. Simply put, in the Insular Cases, the United States Supreme Court
declined to hold Congress to a higher standard than the states with respect to the
Bill of Rights – again, a result contrary to the modern common wisdom that the
Insular Cases placed territories in a less favorable position than the states.
This, however, does not mean that there are no limitations on Congress when
it exercises its powers under the Territorial Clause. It was beyond dispute, even
amongst legal scholars supporting significantly broad congressional authority over
the territories, that, for example, Congress could create territorial offices but could
not make appointments to fill those positions.122 The United States Supreme Court
recognized several such limitations in the Insular Cases themselves; most notably,
that the notion that one Congress cannot bind another Congress did not always
apply, and that “[t]here are steps which can never be taken backward” or otherwise
undone.123
Perhaps most importantly, the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed in the
Insular Cases a prior holding that once a particular federal constitutional right is
extended to a territory through an organic act, Congress cannot withdraw that right
through subsequent legislation, for doing so would render the Constitution “no
greater authority than an ordinary act of Congress.”124 Thus, while the Insular Cases
permitted Congress to exercise its discretion to, for example, withhold the right to
a jury trial in Puerto Rico, it could not subsequently repeal the right to a jury trial
after electing to grant it.125 As one scholar succinctly put it, the Insular Cases in that
121. Dorr v. United States, 195 U.S. 138, 147–48 (1904) (quoting COOLEY, PRINCIPLES OF CONST. LAW
§ 4.3).
122. Baldwin, supra note 30, at 399.
123. Downes, 182 U.S. at 261.
124. Id. at 269–70 (citing Springville v. Thomas, 166 U.S. 707 (1897)).
125. Id. at 270.
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sense “served the aims of empire in a different and unexpected way: not by opening
the door to the annexation of American colonies, but by paving the way for their
release.”126 In other words, “[t]he retreat of American colonial rule, not its
projection, was what the Insular Cases authorized,” in that these newly-annexed
territories would either be relinquished after temporary American stewardship or
transition to statehood or other permanent status. 127
A necessary part of any such transition to statehood or other permanent
status within the United States is the establishment of a territorial government
elected by the people. Although most of the scholarship and case law on the Insular
Cases has primarily focused on the distinction between incorporated and
unincorporated territories, the Insular Cases also differentiated between so-called
“organized” and “unorganized” territories. 128 Under this framework, a territory is
“organized” if it operates under a civil government constituted either under a
territorial constitution or organic act which includes “a bill of rights and the
establishment and conditions of the insular area’s tripartite government,” but is
“unorganized” if the territory is not self-governing and is under the direct control
of the federal government.129
The distinction between organized and unorganized territories is not merely
academic. The Guarantee Clause of the United States Constitution requires that the
United States “guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of
Government.”130 In the Insular Cases, the Supreme Court of the United States
reaffirmed its well-entrenched precedents that the Guarantee Clause is not
automatically self-executing in any territory, whether incorporated or
unincorporated, but emphasized that there may come a time in a territory’s
development in which it may become applicable:
Notwithstanding its duty to “guarantee to every state in this Union a
republican form of government,” Art. IV, sec. 4, by which we
understand, according to the definition of Webster, “a government in
which the supreme power resides in the whole body of the people, and
is exercised by representatives elected by them,” Congress did not
hesitate, in the original organization of the territories of Louisiana,
Florida, the Northwest Territory, and its subdivisions of Ohio, Indiana,
Michigan, Illinois, and Wisconsin and still more recently in the case of
Alaska, to establish a form of government bearing a much greater
analogy to a British Crown colony than a republican state of America,
and to vest the legislative power either in a governor and council, or a
governor and judges, to be appointed by the President. It was not until
126. Burnett, supra note 72, at 799.
127. Burnett, supra note 72, at 799.
128. See, e.g., Rassmussen v. United States, 197 U.S. 516, 517–20 (1905); Dooley v. United States,
183 U.S. 151, 156 (1901).
129. Alexander K. Langton, The Inconsistent Limits of the Commerce and Import-Export Clauses
on Territorial Governments’ Taxing Ability, 69 TAX L. 883, 885 (2016).
130. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4.
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they had attained a certain population that power was given them to
organize a legislature by vote of the people. In all these cases, as well
as in territories subsequently organized west of the Mississippi,
Congress thought it necessary either to extend to Constitution and laws
of the United States over them, or to declare that the inhabitants
should be entitled to enjoy the right of trial by jury, of bail, and of the
privilege of the writ of habeas corpus, as well as other privileges of the
bill of rights.131
Consequently, the Insular Cases themselves provide a clear, bright-line
standard for when the Guarantee Clause must extend to any territory: it occurs
either upon the territory becoming self-governing through a government elected
by the people, or Congress conferring the Bill of Rights to the territory. 132
This finds further support in the plain text of the United States Constitution
itself. The Territorial Clause provides, in pertinent part, that “[t]he Congress shall
have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting
the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States.” 133 The use of the
word “needful” to modify the phrase “Rules and Regulations” necessarily indicates
that this power is limited, and that the ability of Congress to legislate for a territory
cannot be unrestricted. Samuel Johnson’s A Dictionary of the English Language,
which is “generally seen as the most authoritative founding era dictionary,” 134
defines “needful” as “[n]ecessary; indispensably requisite,” and corollary defines
“necessary” as “[n]eedful; indispensably requisite.”135
Thus, at the time of the Founding, the words “needful” and “necessary” were
effectively used as synonyms. In the context of the Constitution’s Necessary and
Proper Clause, the United States Supreme Court has long construed the word
“necessary” in the Constitution as effectively requiring that “the end be legitimate”
and “be within the scope of the constitution.” 136 This is consistent with the
contemporaneous writings of Alexander Hamilton, who wrote that

131. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 278–79 (1901).
132. Id. This conclusion is further bolstered by more recent case law. For example, in Reid v.
Covert, a plurality of the United States Supreme Court characterized the Insular Cases as only standing
for the proposition that Congress has the power “to provide rules and regulations to govern temporarily
territories with wholly dissimilar traditions and institutions.” Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1, 14 (1957)
(emphasis added).
133. U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 3, cl. 2.
134. Jeffrey M. Schmitt, Limiting the Property Clause, 20 NEV. L. J. 145, 152 (2019) (citing Gregory
E. Maggs, A Concise Guide to Using Dictionaries from the Founding Era to Determine the Original
Meaning of the Constitution, 82 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 358, 359 (2014)).
135. SAMUEL JOHNSON, A DICTIONARY OF THE ENGLISH LANGUAGE IN WHICH THE WORDS ARE DEDUCED FROM
THEIR ORIGINALS, EXPLAINED IN THEIR DIFFERENT MEANINGS, AND AUTHORIZED BY THE NAMES OF THE WRITERS IN WHOLE
WORKS THEY ARE FOUND (10th ed. 1792).
136. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 421 (1819).
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a criterion of what is constitutional, and of what is not so . . . is the end,
to which the measure relates as a mean. If the end be clearly
comprehended within any of the specified powers, and if the measure
have an obvious relation to that end, and is not forbidden by any
particular provision of the Constitution, it may safely be deemed to
come within the compass of the national authority. There is also this
further criterion which may materially assist the decision: Does the
proposed measure abridge a pre-existing right of any State, or of any
individual? If it does not, there is a strong presumption in favour of its
constitutionality.137
While not directly referenced in the Insular Cases, the ultimate results of
those decisions were governed largely by this analysis. At the time the Insular Cases
were decided, the pertinent constitutional rights said to not apply to Puerto Rico
and the other territories had never previously been extended, whether under
United States sovereignty or under prior sovereigns, and thus were not pre-existing.
Moreover, declining to extend such rights had an obvious relation to what the
Supreme Court considered—although gravely erroneously—to be a legitimate end:
ensuring that the “savage,” “half-civilized,” “ignorant and lawless” “alien races”
inhabiting those territories were not compelled to follow Anglo-Saxon values.138 But
once Congress has made the decision to extend such rights to a territory, under
what circumstances could eliminating that now pre-existing right be legitimate? As
the Supreme Court recognized, it simply cannot.139
When they were first acquired by the United States, the territories of
American Samoa, Guam, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin Islands were placed under
military rule.140 Over the course of several decades, those territories gradually
obtained greater levels of self-government from Congress, to the point where today
every territory has a democratically-elected local governor and legislature as well
as a fully-developed local judiciary consisting of judges appointed or elected
pursuant to local law.141 Moreover, each territorial constitution or organic act
extends all or most of the federal Bill of Rights to the respective territory. As such,
pursuant to the standard articulated in the Insular Cases, the Guarantee Clause has
now either explicitly or implicitly been extended by Congress to each inhabited
territory. And again, as articulated in the Insular Cases, by organizing these
territories, and thus extending the Guarantee Clause in such a manner, Congress is

137. 8 ALEXANDER HAMILTON, Opinion on the United States Bank, in THE PAPERS OF ALEXANDER
HAMILTON 97, 107 (Syrett ed. 1965) (emphasis added).
138. Downes v. Bidwell, 182 U.S. 244, 287 (1901); see also Baldwin, supra note 30; Thayer, supra
note 30.
139. Downes, 182 U.S. at 278–79.
140. Van Dyke, supra note 46, at 472, 488, 496. As noted earlier, the Northern Mariana Islands
voluntarily joined the United States in 1986 and has thus always been self-governing.
141. See supra discussion in Part I.
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bound to the extension and cannot simply take a step backward by rescinding it at
some future date.142
What, then, is the practical effect of this? Simply put, Congress cannot undo—
under the Territorial Clause or otherwise—what it has already done. It cannot
unilaterally repeal a territorial constitution and reimpose military rule on that
territory,143 or enact new legislation eliminating a territory’s locally elected
governor or locally appointed territorial supreme court and replacing them with
federal appointees.144 In other words, once Congress has organized a territory, that
organization cannot subsequently be undone, any more than Congress can rescind
an act recognizing a state.145
The proposition that territorial self-governance is among the “steps which can
never be taken backward” by Congress is certainly not without controversy. 146 For
instance, one may wonder how this proposition could be reconciled with the recent
holding of the Supreme Court of the United States in Financial Oversight &
Management Board for Puerto Rico v. Aurelius Investment, LLC, in which it held that
the members of the congressionally-created entity colloquially known as the
“PROMESA Board” were officers of the territorial government of Puerto Rico and
not officers of the United States and thus do not require Senate confirmation under
the Appointments Clause of the United States Constitution.147 The congressional
legislation creating the PROMESA Board, among other things, conferred that Board
with the authority to set its own budget for the government of Puerto Rico without
the consent of Puerto Rico’s governor or legislature.148 Is this not, then, a textbook
example of Congress undoing a prior grant of self-governance to a territory by
divesting the elected government of Puerto Rico from control over perhaps one of
its most fundamental governmental powers?149
142. Downes, 182 U.S. at 261.
143. See generally Adam W. McCall, Why Congress Cannot Unilaterally Repeal Puerto Rico’s
Constitution, 102 CORNELL L. REV. 1367 (2017).
144. See United States v. Mercado-Flores, 312 F. Supp. 3d 249, 255 (D.P.R. 2015).
145. Downes, 182 U.S. at 261.
146. See id.
147. Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R. v. Aurelius Inv., LLC, 140 S. Ct. 1649, 1665 (2020).
148. 48 U.S.C. §§ 2121(d)(1)(B)–(C), (e)(3).
149. It is worth noting that the authority of Congress to establish the PROMESA Board and vest it
with such powers to the exclusion of the elected government of Puerto Rico was not at issue in the
Aurelius case—the question presented to the United States Supreme Court was limited to whether the
members of the PROMESA Board required Senate confirmation. See 140 S. Ct. at 1671 (Sotomayor, J.,
concurring) (“One would think the Puerto Rican home rule that resulted from that mutual enterprise
might affect whether officers later installed by the Federal Government are properly considered officers
of Puerto Rico rather than ‘Officers of the United States’ subject to the Appointments Clause. Yet the
parties do not address that weighty issue or any attendant questions it raises. I thus do not resolve those
matters here and instead concur in the judgment.” (citation omitted)). Rather, it was simply an
“unstated assumption” that Congress possessed the constitutional authority to create the PROMESA
Board and vest it with those powers, and it may very well be the case that this assumption may ultimately
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The answer is, perhaps surprisingly, no. Again, it is critically necessary to
reemphasize that “[t]he simple words of the opinions . . . are not as important as
the contexts in which those cases were decided,” 150 and that “the precedential
value of a decision is defined by the context of the case from which it arose.” 151 To
do so, it is necessary to look at the circumstances that gave rise to passage of the
legislation establishing the PROMESA Board and vesting it with these powers.
The Bankruptcy Clause of the United States Constitution vests the Congress
with the enumerated power to enact “uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies
throughout the United States.”152 The power of Congress under the Bankruptcy
Clause has long been characterized by the Supreme Court of the United States and
lower federal courts as not just a plenary power, but a “supreme power,” to which
even the states are wholly subservient.153 Congress has exercised this power to,
among other things, permit state municipalities and other public corporations and
instrumentalities to restructure their debts under a procedure set forth in Chapter
9 of the Bankruptcy Code, and to preempt state laws to the contrary.154
As a result of expiration of certain tax incentives and the global financial crisis
of 2008, Puerto Rico and its instrumentalities incurred substantial, and largely
unserviceable, debt.155 Although the Bankruptcy Code included Puerto Rico within
the statutory definition of a “state,” it also expressly precluded Puerto Rico’s
municipalities from being debtors under Chapter 9. 156 Therefore, Puerto Rico
enacted its own debt modification procedure, known as the Puerto Rico
Corporation Debt Enforcement and Recovery Act, which provided for a procedure
like Chapter 9 with a “court-supervised restructuring process intended to offer the
best solution for the broadest group of creditors.” 157
The Supreme Court of the United States, however, determined in Puerto Rico
v. Franklin California Tax-Free Trust that the preemption clause of Chapter 9
nevertheless preempted the municipal bankruptcy laws of Puerto Rico just as it
does the laws of the fifty states.158 That the United States Supreme Court engaged
in a preemption analysis under the Bankruptcy Clause is itself significant. If it were
be rejected in a future proceeding where the issue is raised and fully briefed. See, e.g., Sakamoto v. Duty
Free Shoppers, Ltd., 764 F.2d 1285, 1287–88 (9th Cir. 1985). However, as shall be explained shortly,
Congress does, in fact, have the authority to establish the PROMESA Board—not pursuant to its powers
under the Territorial Clause, but under its enumerated power to enact “uniform Laws on the subject of
Bankruptcies throughout the United States.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
150. King v. Morton, 520 F.2d 1140, 1147 (D.C. Cir. 1975).
151. UC Health v. NLRB, 803 F.3d 669, 683 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (Edwards, J., concurring).
152. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
153. See New York v. Irving Trust Co., 288 U.S. 329, 333 (1933); see also Sacred Heart Hosp. v.
Dep’t of Pub. Welfare (In re Sacred Heart Hosp.), 133 F.3d 237, 243 (3d Cir. 1998); Hood v. Tenn. Student
Assistance Corp. (In re Hood), 262 B.R. 412 (B.A.P. 6th Cir. 2001).
154. See 11 U.S.C. §§ 901–46.
155. Puerto Rico v. Franklin Cal. Tax-Free Tr., 579 U.S. 115, 118 (2016).
156. Id.
157. Id. at 119.
158. Id. at 126–28.
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the case that the Territorial Clause confers Congress with the absolute and
unrestricted plenary power to make any law whatsoever for the territories—
whether organized or unorganized, incorporated or unincorporated—there would
be no need to conduct any sort of preemption analysis under the Bankruptcy
Clause. Under such a broad reading of the Territorial Clause, it would have been
sufficient to simply note that Congress could exercise plenary authority under the
Territorial Clause to legislate for Puerto Rico, without the need for any more
extensive preemption analysis under the Bankruptcy Clause or otherwise. On the
contrary, the United States Supreme Court went to great lengths to examine the
effect of the preemption provision on the laws of the states, and heavily
emphasized its belief that Congress had treated Puerto Rico no differently than a
state with respect to the applicability of its local laws.159 In fact, neither the majority
opinion nor the dissenting opinion mention or cite to the Territorial Clause.
It is this situation—the Supreme Court of the United States striking down a
local Puerto Rico bankruptcy statute, holding that only Congress could act—which
resulted in the legislation creating the PROMESA Board. While Congress identified
the Territorial Clause and not the Bankruptcy Clause as the constitutional basis for
the legislation creating the PROMESA Board,160 it did so for political reasons: “by
avoiding the term ‘bankruptcy,’ and relying on its authority under the Territories
Clause of the Constitution, lawmakers may have sought to reassure state
bankruptcy critics that PROMESA is not intended to lay a foundation for state
bankruptcy.”161 Importantly, the United States Supreme Court in Aurelius expressly
rejected reliance on the labels chosen by Congress, instead electing to look beyond
the terms used and examine the substance of the matter.162
Certainly, it is not in dispute that the legislation establishing the PROMESA
Board represents a significant infringement on the right of Puerto Rico to govern
itself. The question, however, is not whether the PROMESA Board infringes on the
self-governance of Puerto Rico, but whether it does so to an extent that would not
be permitted against a state.
As alluded to earlier, the conception of state “sovereignty” under the United
States Constitution is in many ways a legal fiction or myth. While nominally
sovereign, Congress possesses substantial—and in some cases, plenary—authority
over numerous aspects of state operations, including the right of a state to govern
itself. Under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution, Congress
possesses plenary authority over the states in all areas in which federal power
exists, including enacting federal laws that “curtail or prohibit the States’
prerogatives to make legislative choices respecting subjects the States may
consider important.”163
Such federal powers include the power to regulate interstate commerce
under the Commerce Clause, a power which is so broad that it has been described
159. See id. at 126–27.
160. 48 U.S.C. § 2121(b)(2).
161. David Skeel, Reflections on Two Years of P.R.O.M.E.S.A., 87 REV. JUR. U.P.R. 862, 873 (2018).
162. Fin. Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R. v. Aurelius Inv., LLC, 140 S. Ct. 1649, 1661 (2020).
163. Hodel v. Va. Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass’n, 452 U.S. 264, 290 (1981).
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as authorizing Congress to regulate virtually anything,164 with Chief Justice Marshall
famously writing that “the power over commerce . . . is vested in Congress as
absolutely as it would be in a single government” and “the influence which their
constituent possess at elections, are . . . the sole restraints” on that power. 165 This
includes state governmental spending, in that the Supreme Court of the United
States has already affirmed the constitutionality of a federal statute that mandated
a salary freeze for all state government employees, expressly rejecting the
argument that the sovereign status of the states precluded Congress from taking
such action in response to an economic emergency.166 In fact, the Supreme Court
of the United States even acquiesced to Congress dissolving the state government
of Georgia and placing the state under military rule during the Reconstruction Era
pursuant to its authority under the Guarantee Clause. 167
The field of bankruptcy is one such area of plenary congressional authority
over the states. Although Congress has not enacted a law providing for states to
declare bankruptcy, it is largely accepted that it possesses the authority to do so.168
And while most proposals for a system of state bankruptcy focus on voluntary state
bankruptcy, if its Bankruptcy Clause powers reach the states, then it would
necessarily also be within the power of Congress to exercise its plenary power
under the Bankruptcy Clause to provide for a system of involuntary bankruptcy for
a state.169
With these congressional powers and precedents in mind, the legislation
establishing the PROMESA Board and vesting it with such power over the budget of
Puerto Rico, while of substantial local and national importance and concern, is
nevertheless unremarkable as a matter of constitutional law. It is not predicated on
Puerto Rico’s status as a territory. As referenced above, Congress not only retains
similar power over state governments but has utilized such authority in the past,
including over fiscal matters. Moreover, the PROMESA Board is not an original
creation, in that virtually identical boards with similar—and in several cases,
greater—powers have previously been established in the context of municipal
bankruptcies, including in New York City, Detroit, and the District of Columbia. 170
For these reasons, whether a state or territory of the United States is, or is
not, a sovereign is effectively wholly irrelevant to the question of whether the state
164. See Ronald D. Rotunda, King v. Burwell and the Rise of the Administrative State, 23 U. MIAMI
BUS. L. REV. 267, 271 (2015).
165. Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 197 (1824).
166. See Fry v. United States, 421 U.S. 542 (1975).
167. See Georgia v. Stanton, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 50 (1867).
168. See generally, e.g., Michael W. McConnell, Extending Bankruptcy Law to States: Is It
Constitutional?, in WHEN STATES GO BROKE: ORIGINS, CONTEXT, AND SOLUTIONS FOR THE AMERICAN STATES IN FISCAL
CRISIS 229, 229 (Peter Conti-Brown & David Skeel eds., 2012); Steven L. Schwarcz, A Minimalist Approach
to State “Bankruptcy”, 59 UCLA L. REV. 322, 335–36 (2011); David Solan, State Bankruptcy: Surviving a
Tenth Amendment Challenge, 42 GOLDEN GATE U.L. REV. 217, 218 (2012).
169. See Adam Feibelman, Involuntary Bankruptcy for American States, 7 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB.
POL’Y 81, 81 (2012).
170. Skeel, supra note 161, at 864.
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or territory exercises self-governance, including with respect to interpretation of its
state or territorial constitution. As the above examples illustrate, the powers
Congress is authorized to exercise over the supposedly sovereign fifty states are
virtually—if not completely—identical to the power it yields over the territories of
American Samoa, Guam, the Northern Mariana Islands, Puerto Rico, and the U.S.
Virgin Islands. This includes the power of Congress to in effect nullify portions of
state and territorial constitutions it disagrees with by enacting preemptory
legislation through its enumerated powers.171 That Congress may wield such power
over the states and the territories does not render any of those jurisdictions nonself-governing—rather, it simply reflects the reality that
federalism is not at all a system in which two distinct agents pursue
distinct and nonoverlapping goals in distinct spheres of authority, but
rather a system in which two agents pursue the same set of largely
overlapping goals, each exercising independent authority within what
is for many if not most purposes essentially the same sphere of
authority[,]
and that within such a system, the authority of Congress will ultimately prevail
in most cases in the event of a conflict with a given state or territory.172 To somehow
distinguish between congressional preemption or interference with state laws and
identical nullification of territorial law based on abstract notions of “sovereignty,”
Congress simply elevates form over substance and ignores how the United States
Constitution operates in practice in the states and territories that constitute our
federalist system.
III. THE VIABILITY OF TERRITORIAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
This Article has thus far examined the relationship between Congress and
territorial governments and concluded that the Insular Cases and other judicial
precedents, as well as the original meaning and plain text of the Territorial Clause,
place limits on congressional power over the territories. Specifically, Congress
exercises a non-federal power—the power of a state legislature—when it initially
legislates on behalf of the territories but cannot roll back federal constitutional
rights—including the right to a republican form of government—once it has already
elected to extend such rights to a particular territory, except on the same basis as
it could do so with a state pursuant to its enumerated powers.
While this may answer the question of whether territorial courts may
interpret territorial constitutions without interference from Congress, it does not
fully answer whether territorial constitutional law represents a viable means to
safeguard individual rights and liberties for the people of the territories, or to
otherwise ensure parity between the territories and the fifty states. This section
171. See Jim Rossi, The Puzzle of State Constitutions, 54 BUFF. L. REV. 211, 211–12 (2006).
172. JAMES A. GARDNER, INTERPRETING STATE CONSTITUTIONS: A JURISPRUDENCE OF FUNCTION IN A FEDERAL
SYSTEM 234–35 (2005).
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addresses some of the other challenges—both theoretical and practical—to the
idea that territorial courts could both invoke and enforce territorial constitutional
law in a viable manner.
A. The Power of Territorial Courts to Interpret Territorial Constitutions
Congress represents only one of three branches of the federal government.
Even if Congress cannot, for instance, outright repeal the Constitution of Puerto
Rico, can federal courts such as the United States Court of Appeals for the First
Circuit simply disregard decisions of the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico interpreting
that territorial constitution? And since the Revised Organic Act of 1954, although
serving as the de facto territorial constitution of the U.S. Virgin Islands, is nominally
a federal statute, does that mean that the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands must
interpret it as if it were a federal statute rather than a territorial constitution? 173
Moreover, since all territorial constitutions and organic acts were at some point
adopted by Congress through its powers under the Territorial Clause of the United
States Constitution, do the federal courts possess federal question jurisdiction over
issues implicating provisions in such constitutions and organic acts, in effect
permitting either the plaintiff through its filing discretion or the defendant through
its removal discretion to circumvent territorial courts in favor of federal courts and
deprive those courts of opportunities to create or enforce territorial constitutional
law?
If the answer to any of the above questions is “Yes,” then it is difficult to
imagine how territorial courts could serve the same role as state courts in
interpreting their local constitutions to confer positive rights on their people. But
as shall be explained below, the federal courts, like Congress, cannot exercise
plenary and unrestricted authority over the territories. The federal courts do not
have the constitutional or statutory power to effectively serve as “super supreme
courts” empowered to overturn, second-guess, preclude, or otherwise interfere
with the authority of territorial supreme courts to resolve binding and conclusive
questions of territorial constitutional law. Rather, territorial supreme courts may
interpret territorial constitutions and organic acts in the same manner and under
the same terms as state courts of last resort interpreting state constitutions,
including interpreting those documents to confer greater rights than the minimum
required under the United States Constitution.
The issue of deference involves two distinct, yet interrelated, inquiries. Do
federal courts possess plenary power to interpret territorial constitutions and
organic acts, or must they defer to the decisions of territorial supreme courts
interpreting those documents? Similarly, even if territorial supreme courts may
interpret their constitutions or organic acts without interference from the federal
courts, do territorial courts have an obligation to defer to Congress and interpret
such documents pursuant to federal rules of statutory construction, or can they
interpret them in a different manner? Each question is addressed in turn.

173. Bryan v. Fawkes, 61 V.I. 416, 427 (V.I. 2014).
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i. Relations Between Federal and Territorial Courts
Today it is very well-established that federal courts must defer to territorial
courts with respect to their interpretation of territorial statutes and other laws in
the same manner which are the same terms as federal courts deferring to state
courts.174 This includes, among other things, applying the Erie doctrine to the
territories and treating a territorial supreme court decision on a question of
territorial law as binding and conclusive.175 The rationale for such deference is
simple: Congress, by providing for territorial self-government which includes an
independent territorial judiciary, expressed its implicit—and in some cases,
explicit176—intent for the relationship between federal and territorial courts to
mirror the federal-state relationship.177 Such substantial deference applied even
during the transition periods when the federal courts of appeals temporarily
exercised direct appellate or certiorari jurisdiction over newly-formed territorial
supreme courts, with the federal courts only reversing territorial courts on issues
of territorial law if they were inescapably wrong—a standard that, in practice, was
never reached.178
The question of whether federal courts must defer to territorial courts as to
their constructions of territorial constitutions and organic acts, however,
represents a somewhat more difficult question. Unlike territorial statutes, which
are drafted and adopted by territorial legislatures, territorial organic acts are
enacted by Congress without any required input from territorial legislatures which,
in some instances, might not have even existed until after passage of the organic
act. Even territorial constitutions, which ostensibly were adopted by the people of
a territory, are not free of congressional power and input in that at least
theoretically the authority to establish a territorial constitution comes from
Congress,179 with Congress in some instances even mandating that a territorial
constitution be amended prior to becoming legally operative. 180
The issue of whether federal courts should defer to territorial courts with
respect to interpretation of territorial constitutions and organic acts is closely
174. See, e.g., Banks v. Int’l Rental & Leasing Corp., Nos. 08-1603, 08-2512, 2011 WL 7186340, at
*1, *3 (3d Cir. Apr. 19, 2011); Edwards v. Hovensa, LLC, 497 F.3d 355, 360 (3d Cir. 2007); Osorio v. Grupo
Hima San Pablo, Inc., 280 F. Supp. 3d 322, 323 (D.P.R. 2017).
175. See Katy Womble & Courtney Cox Hatcher, Trouble in Paradise? Examining the Jurisdictional
and Precedential Relationships Affecting the Virgin Islands Judiciary, 46 STETSON L. REV. 441, 457–58
(2017).
176. See, e.g., 48 U.S.C. § 1613 (2021).
177. See, e.g., MRL Dev. I, LLC v. Whitecap Inv. Corp., 823 F.3d 195, 201–02, 201 n.2 (3d Cir. 2016).
178. See, e.g., De Castro v. Bd. of Comm’rs, 322 U.S. 451, 458 (1944); Waialua Agric. Co. v.
Christian, 305 U.S. 91, 111 (1938); Pichardo v. V.I. Comm’r of Lab., 613 F.3d 87, 89 (3d Cir. 2010).
179. See Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 579 U.S. 57, 75–76 (2016).
180. See, e.g., United States v. Lopez Andino, 831 F.2d 1164, 1172–73 (1st Cir. 1987) (Torruella,
J., concurring) (noting amendments Congress made to the Constitution of Puerto Rico); Act of June 30,
2010, Pub. L. No. 111-194, 124 Stat. 1309 (disapproving the proposed U.S. Virgin Islands Constitution
unless certain changes are made).
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related to the question of federal jurisdiction. For instance, some federal courts
have issued “drive-by jurisdictional rulings” and other “unrefined dispositions”181 in
which they state, in passing and without any substantive legal analysis, that federal
courts may exercise federal question jurisdiction182 over any matter involving
interpretation of territorial constitutions or organic acts because—unlike territorial
statutes—they purportedly are federal statutes.183
If it is true that every case implicating a territorial organic act or constitution
constitutes a federal question that authorizes federal courts to exercise their
federal question jurisdiction, then territorial constitutional law can never emerge
as a distinct field of the law and cannot serve as an effective mechanism to
safeguard or confer individual rights and liberties to the people of the territories.
The reason for this is clear: under such a regime, decisions of territorial supreme
courts interpreting territorial constitutions and organic acts would have little to no
practical effect. Because federal courts owe no deference to state or territorial
courts on questions of federal law, federal courts could simply ignore the decisions
of territorial supreme courts on such matters.184 And while territorial supreme
courts possess no obligation to defer to lower federal courts and thus their own
interpretations of their territorial constitutions and organic acts would remain
binding within the territorial court system,185 the federal interpretation would
always prevail as a practical matter. This is because if territorial constitutions and
organic acts are federal statutes that form the basis for federal question
jurisdiction, then any litigant who prefers the federal interpretation could simply
bypass the territorial court system entirely—a plaintiff by choosing to file the
complaint in federal court, and a defendant by removing the complaint to federal
court if it were filed in territorial court. In effect, each party would have the option
to in effect veto or nullify a territorial supreme court’s interpretation of the
territorial constitution or organic act, with the territorial court interpretation only
given effect if both parties give their consent by permitting the matter to be
litigated in territorial court.
Nevertheless, the Supreme Court of the United States has clearly established
in a line of cases spanning more than a century, that territorial constitutions and
organic acts do not give rise to federal question jurisdiction, and that the deference
territorial supreme courts must receive with respect to their interpretations of
territorial statutes extends to interpretations of those documents as well. The
reason, again, goes to the question of power: when Congress has exercised the
181. Arbaugh v. Y & H Corp., 546 U.S. 500, 511 (2006).
182. See 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (2021).
183. See, e.g., Dunston v. Mapp, 672 F. App’x 213, 214 n.1 (3d Cir. 2016); Kendall v. Russell, 572
F.3d 126, 131 n.4 (3d Cir. 2009).
184. See, e.g., Vandevere v. Lloyd, 644 F.3d 957, 964 (9th Cir. 2011); Hawkman v. Parratt, 661
F.2d 1161, 1166 (8th Cir. 1981); see also Sumner v. Mata, 449 U.S. 539, 543–44 (1981) (“It has long been
established . . . that even a single federal judge may overturn the judgment of the highest court of a
State insofar as it deals with the application of the United States Constitution or laws to the facts in
question.”).
185. See Hughley v. Gov’t of the V.I., 61 V.I. 323, 337–38 (2014) (collecting cases).
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authority to enact organic acts and to authorize, approve, and amend territorial
constitutions, it does not exercise a federal power.
The United States Supreme Court first recognized this principle in the context
of a territorial organic act in 1894, when it held that even though the organic act of
the then-Territory of Oklahoma codified certain crimes, those crimes were not
“offense[s] against the United States” or “offenses against the federal government”
since Congress did not exercise a federal power in enacting them.186 Rather,
because Congress stood in place of a territorial legislature when enacting those
provisions, they “were to be treated as if [they] had been enacted by the territorial
legislature, and w[ere] to be dealt with as if the crimes thereby declared were
crimes, not against the United States, but against the territory,” and consequently
federal courts lacked jurisdiction over their prosecution.187
The Supreme Court of the United States would consistently reaffirm and
extend this important principle. It held in the same year the Organic Act of the thenTerritory of Utah, although enacted by Congress, was not a “statute of the United
States” and could not form a basis for federal jurisdiction. 188 Twenty years later, in
1914, it directly addressed the question of deference, and expressly held that
interpretation of a provision in the Organic Act of the then-Territory of New Mexico
was “a matter of purely local concern” for which the Supreme Court of New Mexico
was entitled to deference.189
The United States Supreme Court thereafter extended these principles to
Puerto Rico. It held, as it had done previously in the context of the Oklahoma and
Utah Organic Acts, that an act of Congress authorizing the treasurer of Puerto Rico
to file suit to enforce tax laws was not a “law of the United States” even though it
had been enacted by Congress.190 It thereafter considered the question of
deference in a case where the United States Court of Appeals for the First Circuit,
exercising its temporary appellate jurisdiction over the Supreme Court of Puerto
Rico, had reversed the Puerto Rico Supreme Court’s construction of section thirty
nine of the Organic Act of Puerto Rico.191 Ultimately, the United States Supreme
Court reversed the First Circuit, and in doing so emphasized that “section 39 of the
Organic Act is not one of ‘the laws of the United States’” but rather “is peculiarly
concerned with local policy,” and that the First Circuit therefore could not simply
set aside the Puerto Rico Supreme Court’s construction in favor of its own.192
Four decades later, the Supreme Court of the United States again reaffirmed
these decisions in the context of the District of Columbia which, although not a
territory, is subject to the plenary control of Congress through the Seat of
Government Clause.193 It held, as it had previously done with Puerto Rico and other
186. United States v. Pridgeon, 153 U.S. 48, 53 (1894).
187. Id.
188. Linford v. Ellison, 155 U.S. 503, 508 (1894).
189. Santa Fe Cent. Ry. Co. v. Friday, 232 U.S. 694, 700 (1914).
190. Puerto Rico v. Russell & Co., 288 U.S. 476, 483 (1933).
191. Rubert Hermanos, Inc. v. Puerto Rico, 106 F.2d 754, 759 (1st Cir. 1939).
192. Puerto Rico v. Rubert Hermanos, Inc., 309 U.S. 543, 550 (1940).
193. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 17.
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territories, that “the same deference is owed to the courts of the District with
respect to their interpretations of Acts of Congress directed toward the local
jurisdiction.”194 In fact, the United States Supreme Court granted this deference to
the District of Columbia courts even though the District of Columbia then—as
now—is less self-governing than any of the territories; in fact, the judges of the
District of Columbia Court of Appeals and the Superior Court of the District of
Columbia continue to be nominated by the President of the United States and
confirmed by the United States Senate, without the approval of the mayor or other
locally-elected leaders.195
A decade later, the United States Supreme Court reaffirmed its commitment
to territorial deference through what it elected not to do. In Frazier v. Heebe, the
Supreme Court of the United States invoked its supervisory power over the federal
district courts to abolish local court rules that limited bar admission to those federal
courts only to residents.196 The United States District Court for the Virgin Islands,
however, continued to enforce a court rule limiting admission to its bar only to
residents of the U.S. Virgin Islands, which the United States Court of Appeals for the
Third Circuit struck down after determining that the Heebe decision controlled.197
While the United States Supreme Court affirmed the Third Circuit in the ultimate
result, it expressly rejected that court’s reliance on Heebe:
In Frazier v. Heebe . . . we invoked supervisory power over district
courts of the United States to invalidate discriminatory residency
requirements for admission to the Bar of the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Louisiana. The Court of Appeals in the
case now before us expressed “no doubt” that our supervisory power
extends to the bar requirements of the District Court of the Virgin
Islands.
Without attempting to define the limits of our supervisory power,
we decline to apply it in this case. Both the nature of the District Court
of the Virgin Islands and the reach of its residency requirements
implicate interests beyond the federal system. As to the former, the
District Court, which was given its current form and jurisdiction by
Congress in the Revised Organic Act of 1954 . . . is not a United States
district court, but an institution with attributes of both a federal and a
territorial court. Although it is vested with the jurisdiction of a United
States district court, the District Court also has original jurisdiction over
certain matters of local law not vested in the local courts of the Virgin
Islands as well as concurrent jurisdiction with the local courts over
certain criminal matters. It also serves as an appellate court for
decisions rendered by the local courts. In fact, Congress provides in the
Revised Organic Act that, for certain purposes, the District Court “shall
194. Pernell v. Southall Realty, 416 U.S. 363, 367 (1974).
195. See Act of July 29, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-358, 84 Stat. 473.
196. Frazier v. Heebe, 482 U.S. 641 (1987).
197. Thorstenn v. Barnard, 842 F.2d 1393, 1397 n.6 (3d Cir. 1988).

2022

TERRITORIAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

239

be considered a court established by local law.” The application of [the
bar admission rule] itself similarly extends beyond practice in the
federal system. Unlike the rule in Heebe, which was confined to practice
before the United States District Court, [the rule] applies to admission
to the Bar of the Virgin Islands, and so governs practice before the
territorial courts.
Because these territorial interests are intertwined with the
operation of [the bar admission rule], we decline to examine this case
as an issue of supervisory power.198
The United States Supreme Court then went on to consider the question as
one arising under the Privileges and Immunities Clause of the United States
Constitution, which had been extended to the U.S. Virgin Islands through the Virgin
Islands Revised Organic Act.199
Most recently, the Supreme Court of the United States confronted the
deference question in Limtiaco v. Camacho, in which it had granted certiorari to
review a decision of the Supreme Court of Guam adjudicating a lawsuit between
the Attorney General of Guam and the Governor of Guam.200 That decision involved
interpretation of a provision of the Guam Organic Act limiting the amount of debt
the Guamanian government could incur. The parties fully briefed the question of
deference, with the Governor of Guam arguing that the United States Supreme
Court should defer to the Guam Supreme Court’s construction, while the Attorney
General of Guam maintained that no deference was due.
The United States Supreme Court in Limtiaco ultimately declined to defer to
the Guam Supreme Court. Nevertheless, it did not overrule any of its prior
precedents regarding deference to territorial courts. On the contrary, it reaffirmed
that federal courts “accord deference to territorial courts over matters of purely
local concern,” but determined that the debt-limitation provision, although
included in the Guam Organic Act, “is not a matter of purely local concern,” since
“the potential consequences of territorial insolvency” would be borne by the United
States and not Guam alone.201 To eliminate any doubt that it was not overturning
its prior decisions and that territorial supreme courts must continue to receive
deference on all matters of local concern, the United States Supreme Court
concluded its opinion by again emphasizing that “decisions of the Supreme Court
of Guam, as with other territorial courts . . . are entitled to respect when they
indicate how statutory issues, including the Organic Act, apply to matters of local
concern.”202

198. Barnard v. Thorstenn, 489 U.S. 546, 551–52 (1989) (internal citations omitted).
199. Id. at 552–53.
200. Limtiaco v. Camacho, 549 U.S. 483 (2007).
201. Id. at 491–92.
202. Id. (emphasis added).
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ii. Interpretation of Territorial Constitutions and Organic Acts
For more than a century, the Supreme Court of the United States has clearly
and emphatically held that federal courts must defer to territorial courts on all
issues of purely local concern, including interpretation of territorial constitutions
and organic acts, and that such documents—standing alone—cannot establish
federal question jurisdiction. Territorial courts thus unquestionably possess the
power to interpret their territorial constitutions and organic acts without being
subject to having those decisions overruled or otherwise interfered with by the
federal courts.
But how should territorial courts go about actually interpreting their territorial
constitutions and organic acts? It is easy, in principle, to simply say that a territorial
supreme court should interpret a territorial constitution in the same manner as a
state supreme court interprets a state constitution. But state supreme courts do
not interpret state constitutions uniformly. Because state supreme courts are
largely unconstrained in how they may interpret their state constitutions due to the
inability of the Supreme Court of the United States to review the correctness of
those interpretations, they have collectively developed a variety of different—and
sometimes contradictory—methods of state constitutional interpretation
employed by state courts.203
The proliferation of such competing theories of state constitutional
interpretation may be attributed to the idea that
Americans are now a people who are so much alike from state to state,
and whose identity is so much associated with national values and
institutions, that the notion of significant local variations in character
and identity is just too implausible to take seriously as the basis for a
distinct constitutional discourse.204
To the extent this may be true—at least in the fifty states—it is rather easy to
dismiss the interpretative methods adopted by state supreme courts as pretextual,
with courts attempting to engage in “principled decision-making to avoid the
criticism of being merely results-oriented.”205 After all, if the Supreme Court of the
United States has already interpreted phrases such as “equal protection” and “due
process” to mean one thing in the United States Constitution, how can a state
supreme court principally reach a completely different—sometimes entirely
opposite—conclusion?
In addition to concerns about being results-oriented, there are practical
reasons for state constitutional interpretation to develop differently and without
uniformity. While debates about federal constitutional interpretation often focus
203. Rachel A. Van Cleave, State Constitutional Interpretation and Methodology, 28 N.M. L. REV.
199, 219 (1998).
204. James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 MICH. L. REV. 761, 818
(1992).
205. Van Cleave, supra note 203, at 220.
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on overarching theories such as originalism or the living constitution, theories of
this sort have relatively little place—at least as a practical matter—in state
constitutional adjudication. This is largely “[b]ecause state constitutions are
iterative, derivative, and assimilative,” in that “they are not crafted solely out of
framers’ creativity but rather arise from multiple sources—they are derived from
earlier versions, created by newly western Americans from pre-existing states,
modeled on the consensus of experts, and forged under substantial and systemic
congressional pressure to conform.” 206 As such, it is often extraordinarily difficult
to even identify the “founding fathers” of a state—let alone determine their intent
in adopting certain language in a state constitution—particularly in states where
the state constitution may be amended by citizen referendum. 207 Moreover, there
is a serious concern, at least regarding more recent state constitutions, that
“interested delegates manipulated the convention’s historical record” knowing that
future courts may rely on transcripts of floor statements and other history.208
It is for these reasons that one of the most popular methods of state
constitutional interpretation downplays the constitutional text itself in favor of
ascertaining whether the state or its legal system is sufficiently “unique” or
“distinctive” from the rest of the United States in some aspect to justify interpreting
a state constitutional provision differently from how the Supreme Court of the
United States and other federal courts interpreted similar or identical provisions in
the United States Constitution.209 “This theory assumes that state constitutionalism
is the same as federal constitutionalism unless the state court is able to point to a
uniqueness in the state charter.”210 In effect, by following this approach, “the state
court ends up isolating itself from the national discourse and debate on
constitutionalism.”211
It stands to reason that this method of state constitutional interpretation
readily translates to territorial constitutions. In both form as well as substance,
territorial constitutions such as the Constitution of Puerto Rico are remarkably like
state constitutions, in that the drafters borrowed provisions from or were
otherwise inspired by a variety of sources. 212 Moreover, such territorial
constitutions were initially drafted by representatives of the people of the territory,
and in many cases were ratified by popular vote.213 And while it is certainly true
that Congress played a substantive role in the adoption of the Constitution of
206. Michael Schwaiger, Understanding the Unoriginal: Indeterminant Originalism and
Independent Interpretation of the Alaska Constitution, 22 ALASKA L. REV. 293, 300 (2005).
207. See, e.g., Sands v. Morongo Unified Sch. Dist., 809 P.2d 809 (Cal. 1991) (illustrating
disagreement among the justices of the California Supreme Court as to the history surrounding the
adoption of the provisions at issue).
208. Schwaiger, supra note 206, at 301–02.
209. Van Cleave, supra note 203, at 221–22.
210. Van Cleave, supra note 203, at 220.
211. Van Cleave, supra note 203, at 220.
212. See generally Hiram A. Melendez-Juarbe, Privacy in Puerto Rico and the Madman’s Plight:
Decisions, 9 GEO. J. OF GENDER & L. 1 (2008).
213. Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 579 U.S. 59, 73 (2016).
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Puerto Rico by directing that certain language be amended, this was not unusual,
in that it had previously exercised similar veto power over the proposed
Constitutions of Louisiana, Utah, New Mexico, and Hawaii, and it has never been
seriously argued that those state constitutions are of a lesser character or subject
to different interpretative methods.214
But what of territorial organic acts, such as those that remain in place in the
U.S. Virgin Islands and Guam? Thus far, this Article has largely treated territorial
constitutions and territorial organic acts largely interchangeably. Even if territorial
supreme courts must receive deference from the federal courts in interpreting
territorial organic acts, what methods of interpretation should they employ?
Territorial supreme courts could certainly treat territorial organic acts as fully
equivalent to territorial constitutions and apply one of the many methods of state
constitutional interpretation. Yet is this appropriate, given the potentially more
active role that Congress may have played in the adoption of a territorial organic
act as opposed to a territorial constitution? For instance, since territorial organic
acts are statutes enacted by Congress—even if they are not necessarily “laws of the
United States”215—should territorial supreme courts simply interpret them
pursuant to the same rules of statutory construction that would apply in
interpreting any other statute? And if territorial organic acts should be interpreted
in the same manner as other statutes enacted by Congress, can it really be said that
territorial organic acts are the equivalent of “constitutions”?
As a practical matter, the question of how courts should interpret the Virgin
Islands Revised Organic Act of 1954 and the Guam Organic Act is purely academic.
Even if territorial courts should interpret territorial organic acts pursuant to the
rules of statutory construction, application of those rules should lead to the same
result as rejecting those rules, at least with respect to safeguarding individual rights
and liberties. Congressional intent is of paramount importance in determining how
to interpret a statute enacted by Congress.216 In enacting the Virgin Islands Revised
Organic Act and the Guam Organic Act, Congress both explicitly and implicitly
intended to treat the U.S. Virgin Islands and Guam as if they were states, including
treating their territorial court systems as if they were state courts and providing
that they share the same relationship with the federal courts as the fifty states. 217
While “unlike the constitutional federalism governing the relationship between
state and federal courts, federalism in [the territories] is administrative rather than
constitutional,” the fact remains that Congress provided for this sort of relationship
in the territorial organic acts, and thus the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands and
the Supreme Court of Guam may exercise the powers of a state supreme court,

214. Eric Biber, The Price of Admission: Causes, Effects, and Patterns of Conditions Imposed on
States Entering the Union, 46 AM. J. LEGAL HIST. 119, 132–73 (2004).
215. Balboni v. Ranger Am. of the V.I., 70 V.I. 1048, 1076-77 (V.I. 2019).
216. See, e.g., McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144 (1992).
217. See Balboni v. Ranger Am. of the V.I., Inc., 70 V.I. 1048, 1071 (2019); see also Water Isle Hotel
& Beach Club, Ltd. v. Kon Tiki St. Thomas, Inc., 795 F.2d 325, 328 (3d Cir. 1986); Gov’t of Virgin Islands ex
rel. Robinson v. Schneider, 893 F.Supp. 490, 495 (D.V.I. 1995).
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regardless of whether they do so pursuant to congressional grace or some higher
authority.218
Nevertheless, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in an
opinion issued during its temporary certiorari oversight over the Supreme Court of
Guam, reviewed de novo a decision of the Guam Supreme Court interpreting a
provision in the “Bill of Rights” of the Guam Organic Act, and held that the language
could not be interpreted to confer greater protection than the United States
Constitution simply because “Guam is not a state, has no locally adopted
constitution, and its ‘Bill of Rights’ was passed not by its citizens, but rather by
Congress.”219 As a threshold matter, this decision is inconsistent with both past and
future decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States providing that that
territorial courts must receive deference in their interpretations of territorial
organic acts, even on direct review by a federal court,220 which the Ninth Circuit did
not discuss or even cite in its decision.221 But even more fundamentally, the Ninth
Circuit ignored the overwhelming legislative history reflecting that Congress, in
enacting the Guam Organic Act and the Virgin Islands Revised Organic Act, did in
fact intend for those documents to potentially confer greater rights than the
minimum required by the United States Constitution.222 It is for this reason that the
Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands, in its seminal decision in Balboni v. Ranger
American of the V.I., Inc., expressly rejected the Ninth Circuit’s approach and held
that it possesses the inherent and statutory power to independently interpret the
Virgin Islands Revised Organic Act of 1954.223
While the “Bill of Rights” found in the Guam Organic Act and the Virgin Islands
Revised Organic Act bear some superficial similarity to the Bill of Rights in the
United States Constitution, the legislative history “reveals that Congress did not
model the [territorial] Bill of Rights after the United States Constitution,” but
“rather, it adopted ‘familiar provisions found in various organic acts and in State
constitutions in relation to the Bill of Rights.’”224 This interpretation is further
supported by contemporary judicial decisions stating that the Virgin Islands Bill of
Rights “supplemented” the federal Bill of Rights,225 which the Supreme Court of the
United States has held “are entitled to great weight, because they dealt with
territorial powers in operation at a time . . . that the judges who rendered them
well may be credited with such knowledge of the purpose of these powers and their
history and application.”226
218. Balboni, 70 V.I. at 1071–72.
219. Guam v. Guerrero, 290 F.3d 1210, 1216 (9th Cir. 2002).
220. See discussion supra Part III.C.1.
221. See Guerrero, 290 F.3d 1210.
222. Balboni, 70 V.I. at 1061.
223. Balboni, 70 V.I. at 1061.
224. Id. at 1062 (quoting 80 Cong. Rec. 6609 (1936) (statement of Senator William H. King of
Utah)).
225. E.g., United States ex rel. Leguillou v. Davis, 115 F. Supp. 392, 396 (D.V.I. 1953), overruled on
other grounds by United States ex rel. Leguillou v. Davis, 212 F.2d 691 (3d Cir. 1954).
226. Puerto Rico v. Shell Co., 302 U.S. 253, 266 (1937).
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Perhaps most significantly, however, is that Congress subsequently amended
both the Guam Organic Act and the Virgin Islands Revised Organic Act to add a new
provision providing for most provisions of the federal Bill of Rights, as well as the
Fourteenth Amendment, to apply to Guam and the U.S. Virgin Islands. Importantly,
during the congressional hearings on the 1968 amendments to the Virgin Islands
Revised Organic Act and Guam Organic Act, “numerous witnesses testified that
decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States codifying the principle of ‘one
man, one vote’ were not applicable to the Virgin Islands [and Guam], even though
they were decided based on the equal protection clause.” 227 “Had Congress
intended for the equal protection clause in the Virgin Islands [and Guam] Bill of
Rights to not have any independent meaning, but to only be interpreted identically
to the equal protection clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, then the ‘one man,
one vote’ decisions of the United States Supreme Court premised on the Fourteenth
Amendment’s equal protection clauses would have already been automatically
extended to the Virgin Islands [and Guam] without the need for any further
congressional action.”228 Rather, “in enacting the [territorial] Bill of Rights and
modelling it after language found in state constitutions,” and then “subsequently
extending the Fourteenth Amendment to the [territories] as if [they] were a state
without repealing the earlier guarantees of the [territorial] Bill of Rights,” Congress
“manifested an intent for the equal protection and due process clauses of the
Fourteenth Amendment to serve as a floor . . . while preserving the possibility that
the equal protection and due process clauses of the [territorial] Bill of Rights—
modeled after similar state constitutional provisions—could be construed by a
court to confer greater rights to the people of the Virgin Islands [and Guam] than
the minimum provided for in the United States Constitution.”229 Such an
interpretation is the only one that would not render the 1968 amendments to the

227. Balboni, 70 V.I. at 1064–65 (quoting Virgin Islands—Elective Governor and Legislative
Redistricting: Hearing on H.R. 11777 & H.R. 13277 Before the H. Comm. on Interior and Insular Affairs,
89th Cong. 675 (1966) (statement of Harry R. Anderson, Assistant Secretary of the Interior) (“[T]he
proposed amendment incorporates and makes applicable to any reapportionment the language of the
equal protection clause of the 14th Amendment of the Constitution, which language is the basis of the
Supreme Court's ‘one man-one vote’ decisions. While those decisions are not for application in the Virgin
Islands, we nevertheless strongly believe in the correctness of the principle stated and by the foregoing
we would provide for its enforcement in the Virgin Islands....”); 89th Cong. 679 (statement of Ruth Van
Cleve, Director, Office of Territories, Department of the Interior) (“As the Secretary stated a moment
ago, it is our conclusion that those decisions don't themselves apply, because the equal protection
language of the 14th Amendment is by its own terms applicable only to the States.”); 89th Cong. 692
(statement of Dr. Aubrey A. Anduze, President of the Virgin Islands Constitutional Convention)
(“Although the constitutional requirement of one man, one vote does not apply to such provisions as
the Congress may see fit to make for the Virgin Islands, a regard for essential democratic principles does
require that this constitutional doctrine be extended to the islands. To the extent that H.R. 13277
advances in such a direction, it is [a] step which I believe the Congress ought to take.”)).
228. Balboni, 70 V.I. at 1065.
229. Id. at 1068–69.
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Guam Organic Act and the Virgin Islands Revised Organic Act “completely
superfluous.”230
Further support for the proposition that territorial courts need not interpret
words and phrases in territorial organic acts in the same manner as identical
language in the federal constitution or federal statutes is again found in judicial
decisions addressing virtually identical questions in the context of the District of
Columbia. In Hall v. C & P Telephone Co., the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit considered “the application of Erie principles to the
construction by the District of Columbia Court of Appeals of a special type of
statute: an Act of Congress that applies exclusively to the District of Columbia but
whose substance merely mirrors that of another federal statute that applies to the
nation as a whole.”231 Even though “Congress acted pursuant to its plenary
authority to exercise legislative power for the District of Columbia” and the case
involved “a statute that merely applies the terms of another federal statute” which
“the D.C. Council has no power to amend or repeal,” the court nevertheless
determined that the act was a local law and that the interpretation of that law by
the District of Columbia Court of Appeals was binding in light of the congressional
intent to treat the District of Columbia court system as if it were a state court
system.232
That Congress intentionally modeled the judicial systems of the territories and
the District of Columbia after state judiciaries and similarly modeled territorial
organic acts after state constitutions is impressive evidence of its intent for
territorial courts to interpret territorial organic acts in the same manner as state
courts interpreting a state constitution. Congress was aware that “[t]he Founders
chose a system of joint federal/state sovereigns in part for the benefits it provided:
greater sensitivity to the needs of a diverse society; increased opportunity for
citizen involvement in the democratic process; greater innovation and
experimentation in government; productive competition between states to attract
a mobile citizenry; and increased personal liberty resulting from multiple
governments that check each other's authority.”233 This judicial federalism fosters
a “creative ferment of experimentation” even with respect to adjudication of
constitutional issues.234 Had Congress intended for the territories to be “frozen in
time” with respect to such rights,235 for territorial courts to remain subservient to
the interpretations of federal courts of similarly-worded federal legislation, or to
withhold from the territorial courts the powers universally held by the courts of all
fifty states, it could have easily adopted language expressly providing so. Rather,
the clear intent of Congress is for the territorial courts to partake in the same

230. Id. at 1069.
231. Hall v. C & P Telephone Co., 793 F.2d 1354, 1355 (D.C. Cir. 1986).
232. Id. at 1357–59.
233. Justin Weinstein-Tull, The Structure of Local Courts, 106 VA. L. REV. 1031, 1090 (2020).
234. Paul M. Bator, The State Courts and Federal Constitutional Litigation, 22 WM. & MARY L. REV.
605, 634 (1981).
235. Guam Soc’y of Obstetricians & Gynecologists v. Ada, 776 F. Supp. 1422, 1427 (D. Guam 1990).
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innovation and experimentation—including in interpreting their territorial
constitutions and organic acts—as occurs in the states.
Yet notwithstanding these authorities, some continue to question the
proposition that territorial organic acts can ever be the equivalent of territorial
constitutions. Some scholars and jurists—most notably Justices Stephen Breyer and
Sonia Sotomayor—have in recent years embraced what may be best described as a
theory of Puerto Rico exceptionalism. Although a majority of the Supreme Court
has rejected such exceptionalism, Justices Breyer and Sotomayor and others have
posited that the adoption of a constitution by the popular vote of the people of
Puerto Rico altered its political status, in effect transforming it from a mere territory
into a separate and independent sovereign, akin to a Native American tribe.236
As a threshold matter, the effect—or any lack thereof—of the ratification of
the Constitution of Puerto Rico on Puerto Rico’s political status should have no
bearing on the question of whether other territories such as the U.S. Virgin Islands
possess the authority to definitively interpret their territorial organic acts. As
discussed earlier, the issue of whether a particular United States jurisdiction—
whether state, territory, or tribe—is a sovereign is ultimately irrelevant to that
question.237 Yet while Justices Breyer and Sotomayor have thus far relied on the
popular ratification of the Constitution of Puerto Rico to effectively elevate Puerto
Rico to the same status as the fifty states, others—such as the Government of
Puerto Rico—have invoked it to argue that Puerto Rico should be treated on a more
favorable basis than territories without a popularly-ratified constitution, such as the
U.S. Virgin Islands and Guam.238
The argument that popular ratification of a Constitution of Puerto Rico
somehow elevates Puerto Rico above its sister territories not only elevates form
over substance but does so without any historical or legal basis. To begin with,
approval of a state or territorial constitution through popular vote of the entire
electorate in addition to approval by Congress is a relatively new practice.239 In fact,
the original constitutions of twelve of the original thirteen states, as well as the
United States Constitution and its predecessor, the Articles of Confederation, were
adopted without popular ratification, and new constitutions were not routinely
submitted to the electorate for its direct approval until the mid-nineteenth

236. See P.R. v. Sanchez Valle, 579 U.S. 59, 90–92 (2016) (Breyer, J., dissenting); see also Fin.
Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R. v. Aurelius Inv., 140 S. Ct. 1649, 1677 (Sotomayor, J., concurring).
237. See discussion supra Part III.B.
238. See, e.g., Brief for Petitioner at 38 n.4, Puerto Rico v. Sanchez Valle, 579 U.S. 59 (2016) (No.
15-108).
239. In fact, the historical record contains strong evidence that the approval of Congress is not
even necessary for adoption of a territorial constitution. In 1796, the then-Territory of Tennessee
adopted a new “state” constitution to displace its territorial constitution, and immediately dissolved its
then-territorial government and replaced it with the new government provided for in its new
constitution – several months before Congress approved the constitution and admitted Tennessee as a
state. See Joseph Blocher & Mitu Gulati, Puerto Rico and the Right of Accession, 43 YALE J. INT’L L. 229,
260-61 (2018).
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century.240 Rather, the typical practice had been for either the legislature or a
constitutional convention to draft the constitution, which would then be approved
by Congress. Yet not even the most ardent advocate of Puerto Rico exceptionalism
has argued that popular ratification of the Constitution of Puerto Rico somehow
places it on a higher level than, for example, the Constitution of Delaware.
The practice utilized by the early states—approval by Congress after adoption
by the local legislature—is precisely the procedure followed to adopt the Virgin
Islands Organic Act of 1936. Although Congress enacted the Virgin Islands Organic
Act, it is often overlooked that the Organic Act was not imposed on the U.S. Virgin
Islands unilaterally by Congress. Rather, the Organic Act “had been drafted and
approved by the two democratically-elected Virgin Islands legislatures, with only
minor changes.”241 Not only that, but prior to approving the Organic Act jointly
proposed by the local legislatures, Congress had in fact “previously rejected a draft
version prepared by the Presidentially-appointed governor,” on grounds that it had
not originated from the territory’s elected representatives. 242
B. Hesitancy of Litigants to Choose the Territorial Courts as a Forum
The authorities cited in the prior section provide exceptionally strong support
for the proposition that territorial courts possess the power to interpret territorial
constitutions and organic acts independently of the federal courts and Congress
and may do so to provide greater individual rights and liberties to the people of
their territories than the minimum required by the United States Constitution. But,
as has often been asked in other contexts, “[w]hat good is a grant of power if
attorneys do not think the court will actually use it?”243 Or, even more
fundamentally, how can a territorial court exercise its power under a territorial
constitution or organic act if attorneys never ask a court to do so?
The failure of attorneys to bring civil rights and other public interest
litigation in territorial court is not unique to that forum, but frequently occurs in
state courts as well. Why the reluctance of attorneys to assert state constitutional
claims in state courts? One federal judge posits two likely reasons:
The first is a function of time. Because it took until the 1960s for the
U.S. Supreme Court to complete the individual rights revolution by
incorporating most of the Bill of Rights into the Fourteenth
Amendment, it was not until then that American lawyers, law schools,
and state courts had any reason to think about using state and federal
court systems, and state and federal constitutions, to vindicate civil
240. William B. Fisch, Constitutional Referendum in the United States of America, 54 AM. J. COMP.
L. 485, 485 (2006) (citing WALTER F. DODD, THE REVISION AND AMENDMENT OF STATES CONSTITUTIONS (1910)).
241. Balboni v. Ranger Am. of the V.I., Inc., 70 V.I. 1048, 1062 n.10 (2019) (citing WILLIAM W. BOYER,
AMERICA’S VIRGIN ISLANDS: A HISTORY OF HUMAN RIGHTS AND WRONGS 185–86 (2d ed. 2010)).
242. Id.
243. Eric B. Miller, Lawyers Gone Wild: Are Depositions Still a “Civil” Procedure?, 42 CONN. L. REV.
1527, 1553 (2010).
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rights. We thus are not talking about a set of litigation opportunities, a
litigation strategy, that existed for most of American history. It’s been
roughly fifty years since the U.S. Supreme Court completed much of this
transformation. That’s not a long time, less than a fourth of American
legal history. . . .
The second reason emerges from a central explanation for the
success of the federal rights revolution: the States’ relative
underprotection of individual rights. Who could blame lawyers and
their clients for being reluctant to develop a strategy built in part on
state constitutional rights? The U.S. Supreme Court recognized many
of the rights it did between the 1940s and the 1960s because many
state courts (and state legislatures and state governors) resisted
protecting individual rights, most notably in the South but hardly there
alone. One can forgive lawyers from this era for hesitating to add state
constitutional claims to their newly minted federal claims. Why seek
relief from institutions that created the individual rights vacuum in the
first place?244
Certainly, this first reason—time—applies with even greater force to the
territories. Most territorial court systems are extraordinarily young; for instance,
the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands did not assume jurisdiction until 2007 245
and did not obtain full independence from the United States Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit until 2018.246 And while the legal community’s interest in the
territories has certainly increased in the last several years, most of this interest has
focused on the Insular Cases and other matters of federal law, with the laws of the
territories themselves being “casually disregarded” and in effect “a footnote within
a footnote” of an already niche field. 247 It should come as no surprise, then, that a
substantial number of lawyers—particularly stateside counsel not intimately
familiar with the legal culture of the individual territories 248—are simply not aware
244. SUTTON, supra note 5, at 14.
245. Hypolite v. People, 51 V.I. 97, 101 (2009).
246. Vooys v. Bentley, 901 F.3d 172, 175 (3d Cir. 2018) (en banc) (overturning precedent that
wrongfully extended the certiorari jurisdiction of the Third Circuit beyond the oversight period).
247. J.M. Balkin, The Footnote, 83 N.W. U. L. REV. 275, 302 n.65 (1989).
248. This same principle of unfamiliarity with local legal culture and the greater community often
applies to other national civil rights activists as well. For instance, in the early years of the movement to
obtain judicial recognition of same-sex marriage and similar rights, many attorneys favored bringing such
claims in federal court, out of a belief that federal judges possess an “ivory tower mentality” that makes
them more likely to safeguard individual freedoms and the rights of minority groups. But contrary to this
popular wisdom, when “adjudicating federal constitutional issues . . . state tribunals resolved lesbian
and gay rights claims 56.3 percent more positively than federal courts,” and that state judges who were
elected were even more likely to do so than state judges who were appointed. DANIEL R. PINELLO, GAY
RIGHTS AND AMERICAN LAW 110 (2003). It is likely that this occurred, in part, precisely because federal
judges are more cloistered in that state judges were more likely to have “regularly interact[ed]
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of the changes that have occurred in the territorial courts over the last several
years.
Yet one would think that the second reason—perceptions of which courts are
willing and unwilling to safeguard individual rights—would serve as a compelling
reason to avoid the federal courts as a forum for territorial rights litigation.
Although the federal courts in the mid-twentieth century certainly played a
significant role in eliminating segregation and other abuses of the Jim Crow era
perpetuated by state governments and state courts, the opposite is true of
territorial rights.249 The racist reasoning of the Insular Cases and the doctrine of
territorial incorporation were products of the Supreme Court of the United
States.250 While that Court has certainly retreated from that reasoning and
instructed lower courts not to extend the Insular Cases, the lower federal courts to
this very day continue to do just that: extend the Insular Cases to justify differential
treatment of the territories in a wide variety of contexts that were never addressed
in the Insular Cases themselves.251 And though territorial rights litigation has seen
some limited success in federal court, virtually all those victories occurred in cases
where the federal district judge or one of the federal circuit judges on the panel
was a resident of a United States territory, only for the victory to then be largely
erased after reassignment or appeal to a stateside judge or stateside appellate
panel.252
professionally with gay people” in their local communities than their federal counterparts. John F. Preis,
Reassessing the Purposes of Federal Question Jurisdiction, 42 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 247, 290 (2007).
249.See discussion supra Section I.
250. See cases cited supra notes 31–33 and accompanying text.
251. See discussion supra Section I.B. The question of why the lower federal courts remain hostile
to territorial rights, including continuing to apply and extend the Insular Cases despite the Supreme
Court’s express instruction for them not to do so, is an important matter that requires further study and
examination. However, it appears highly significant that the federal judicial circuits with precedents most
hostile to territorial rights are those that (1) do not have a resident of that territory serving on its
respective federal court of appeals, and (2) have federal district judges serving in the territories who lack
Article III protections, such as life tenure. See generally James T. Campbell, Island Judges, 129 YALE L.J.
1888 (2020).
252. Compare Ballentine v. United States, Civ. No. 1999-130, 2001 WL 1242571 (D.V.I. Oct. 15,
2001) (unpublished mem. written by Moore, D.J.), and Aurelius Inv., LLC v. Puerto Rico, 915 F.3d 838 (1st
Cir. 2019) (written by Torruella, Cir. J.), with Ballentine v. United States, 486 F.3d 806 (D.V.I. Sept. 21,
2006) (unpublished decision written by Thompson, D.J.), aff’d, 486 F.3d 806 (3d Cir. 2007), and Fin.
Oversight & Mgmt. Bd. for P.R. v. Aurelius Inv., LLC, 140 S. Ct. 1649 (2020) (written by Breyer, J.), rev’g
915 F.3d 838. As the district judge that originally heard Ballentine, Judge Moore grew up in Idaho and
moved to the Virgin Islands in 1976. On Island Profile: Judge Thomas K. Moore, THE ST. THOMAS SOURCE
(Mar. 27, 2007), https://stthomassource.com/content/2007/03/27/island-profile-judge-thomas-kmoore/. As the district judge that heard Ballentine on reassignment, Judge Thompson is a New Jersey
native. 486 F.3d 806, 808 (3d Cir. 2007); David Wildstein, Trailblazer: Judge Anne Thompson, NEW JERSEY
GLOBE (Jan. 27, 2022, 12:02 AM), https://newjerseyglobe.com/trailblazer/trailblazer-judge-annethompson-4/. As the circuit judge that originally heard Aurelius, Judge Torruella was a Puerto Rico native.
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Of course, there are some claims where only a federal court could likely
exercise jurisdiction, such as those that require suing the United States as a
defendant. But many—if not most—lawsuits seeking to vindicate territorial rights
could certainly be filed in a territorial court. In fact, there are certain claims that, as
a practical matter, can only be adjudicated on the merits in a territorial court since
it is unlikely that a litigant could establish Article III standing to maintain the claim
in federal court. Why, then, do those bringing public interest litigation on behalf of
the people of the territories almost universally insist on bringing such lawsuits in
federal court and predicating the claims exclusively on the United States
Constitution?
As with state constitutional claims, the unwillingness of attorneys to bring
such litigation in territorial courts appears based on a misperception—not that
territorial courts would be hostile to such claims, but that the territories lack the
power to improve their situation on their own. During this period of renewed
interest in the territories, some legal elites have proposed what they describe as
“new” solutions to the status question. These proposals essentially concede that
the Insular Cases were wrongly decided but ultimately recommend against efforts
to formally overturn the Insular Cases or achieve equality. Rather, these proposals
argue that achieving change is too hard and that the people of the territories and
their allies should just accept their second-class status and instead focus on
achieving what the proponents believe are more “workable” or “pragmatic” goals.
These “workable” and “pragmatic” goals consist of things such as lobbying the
federal government for additional funding,253 establishing a “different but equal”
regime in which territories would be permitted to enact legislation that
discriminates against “mainlanders,”254 and persuading the federal courts to
“actively scrutinize”—but not actually prohibit—“congressional intervention in
territorial self-governance.”255 While given different names by their proponents, all
of these proposals urge the people of the territories to acquiesce to what is best
described as a territorial paternalism.
Why do these scholars urge that the residents of the territories and their allies
abandon the quest for full equal rights? Because the Americans who call the
territories home are “politically powerless,”256 live in “geographic isolation”257 on

Lauren Eckenroth, Honoring Judge Juan R. Torruella, THE RECORD: B.U. SCH. L. (Oct. 27, 2020),
https://www.bu.edu/law/record/articles/2020/honoring-judge-juan-r-torruella/. And Justice Breyer,
author of the Supreme Court’s decision in Aurelius, was born in California and later moved to
Washington, D.C. Wolf Blitzer & Ariane de Vogue, Supreme Court Justice Stephen Breyer Plans to Retire,
CNN
(Jan.
26,
2022,
5:29
PM),
https://www.cnn.com
/2022/01/26/politics/stephen-breyer/index.html.
253. Lin, supra note 21, at 1253.
254. Rennie, supra note 21, at 1708–09.
255. Territorial Federalism, supra note 21, at 1653–54.
256. Lin, supra note 21, at 1252.
257. Lin, supra note 21, at 1264.

2022

TERRITORIAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW

251

“crumbling island[s]”258 with “simple econom[ies]”259 that are “generally
stagnant,”260 have “problems securing safe drinking water,”261 live in fear of being
“prime targets for enemies of the United States,” 262 and generally live their lives
with “a sense of hopelessness”263 because of the “cauldron of burdens that their
fellow citizens in the States do not have to carry.”264 The people of the territories
should not make achieving equal rights their primary focus, because any victories
achieved would “seem like pyrrhic victories when juxtaposed with the grim longterm outlooks of storm-torn neighborhoods, shuttered businesses, bombing
threats, dilapidated schools, and mass exoduses of family and friends.”265 Because
the people of the territories lack the ability to “meaningfully advocate on [their]
behalf via the normal political process,” they must be “protect[ed]” by the federal
courts—but only to a certain point.266 And because the people of the territories
cannot be trusted to preserve their culture, “territorial residents, to coexist
meaningfully—to be equal, in a sense—in the American republican system requires
a different set of rights and obligations for locals,” such as allowing them to enact
race- or ancestry-based restrictions on alienation of land to “mainlanders.” 267
This reasoning is no different from the Insular Cases and the scholarship
written to support unequal treatment, except words like “savage,” “half-civilized,”
and “ignorant” have been replaced with words like “powerless,” “isolated,” and
“hopeless.”268 While purporting to take a moderate or pragmatic position, 269 these
proposals effectively use softer language to embrace the reasoning and result of
the Insular Cases270: that residents of the territories are unable to care for
themselves and should be treated differently by the federal government. The

258. Lin, supra note 21, at 1252.
259. Lin, supra note 21, at 1260.
260. Lin, supra note 21, at 1261.
261. Lin, supra note 21, at 1272.
262. Lin, supra note 21, at 1276.
263. Lin, supra note 21, at 1271.
264. Lin, supra note 21, at 1281.
265. Lin, supra note 21, at 1284.
266. Territorial Federalism, supra note 21, at 1653–54.
267. Rennie, supra note 21, at 1709–10.
268. See cases cited supra note 31; Lin, supra note 21, at 1252, 1264, 1271.
269. Interestingly, Professor Lowell, whose article in the Harvard Law Review provided the
reasoning for the holdings of the Insular Cases, had also portrayed his proposal as a moderate one, as
evidenced by the very title of his article as proposing a “Third Way” to resolve the question of territorial
incorporation. See generally Lowell, supra note 30.
270. Juan R. Torruella, Why Puerto Rico Does Not Need Further Experimentation with its Future:
A Reply to the Notion of “Territorial Federalism,” 131 HARV. L. REV. F. 65, 66 (2018) (“[T]his ‘new’ scheme
is not only not new, but is in fact a repackaging of the same unequal colonial relationship that has been
in place since American troops landed in Guánica in 1898.”).
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proponents of territorial paternalism, while publicly professing support for the
people of the territories, have crossed the line from ally to white savior. 271
Although it would be quite easy to do so, it is beyond the scope of this Article
to deconstruct every one of these offensive stereotypes and misconceptions.272 For
271. The “white savior” is a common trope in literature and film in which the hero of the story—
typically a white man portrayed by the author as enlightened or even Christ-like—serves as a champion
of a marginalized group, such as blacks in the Jim Crow South or the indigenous people of what is
portrayed as a “foreign” land, but in the process reinforces the oppression by providing validation that
the marginalized group is not able to take care of itself. A well-known example of the white savior trope
is Atticus Finch in To Kill a Mockingbird. See Sarah Gerwig-Moore, To Outgrow a Mockingbird:
Confronting Our History—As Well as Our Fictions—About Indigent Defense in the Deep South, 54 GA. L.
REV. 1297, 1302 (2020).
Recently, however, authors and other content creators have begun to recognize the narcissistic
and offensive nature of the characters exhibiting this trope. In many ways, the below scene from the
pilot episode of Star Trek Deep Space Nine encapsulates the white savior mentality through which
otherwise well-meaning legal scholars and lawyers view America’s territories:
BASHIR: This’ll be perfect . . . real . . . frontier medicine . . .
KIRA:
Frontier medicine?
BASHIR: Major. . . I had my choice of any job in the fleet . . .
KIRA:
Did you . . .
BASHIR: I didn’t want some cushy job . . . or a research grant . . . I wanted this. The furthest
reaches of the galaxy. One of the most remote outposts available. This is where the adventure is. This is
where heroes are made. Right here. In the wilderness.
KIRA:
This wilderness is my home.
BASHIR: I didn’t mean . . .
KIRA:
The Cardassians left behind a lot of injured people, Doctor . . . you can make yourself
useful by bringing some of your Federation Medicine to the “natives” . . . you’ll find them a friendly,
simple folk . . .
Star Trek Deep Space Nine: Emissary (Paramount Television Jan. 4, 1993).
272. To give just one example, the characterization of the territories’ delegates to the House of
Representatives as being “powerless” simply because they lack a floor vote ignores the practical reality
that all meaningful legislative work occurs within the House’s committees—on which the territorial
delegates are eligible to serve and even chair—and that legislation will rarely be brought to a floor vote
by Speaker of the House unless passage is expected. As a result, representatives who have a floor vote
but are not permitted to serve on committees are said to be “in exile” and “kind of just a hitchhiker”
with “very little influence.” E.g., Melanie Zanona, ‘They Basically Have Nothing To Do’: Trio of
Republicans
Face
Life
in
Exile,
POLITICO
(Feb.
4,
2019,
6:02
PM),
https://www.politico.com/story/2019/02/04/congress-house-republicans-committee-assignmentsstripped-1145320. For instance, Delegate Stacey Plaskett of the U.S. Virgin Islands sits on the powerful
House Committee on Ways and Means, and as a result exercises substantially more influence in the
House of Representatives than most voting representatives. See Daniel Shaviro, Beyond Public Choice
and Public Interest: A Study of the Legislative Process as Illustrated by Tax Legislation in the 1980s, 139
U. PA. L. REV. 1, 82 (1990) (summarizing empirical studies of Congress).
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present purposes, the only relevant consideration is whether territorial courts may
utilize territorial constitutional law to grant more meaningful relief to litigants
seeking to vindicate territorial rights than federal courts. As the prior sections
illustrate, the territorial courts certainly possess that power. Yet even more
importantly, territorial courts have demonstrated that when given the opportunity
they will exercise that power and enforce provisions of territorial constitutions and
organic acts in instances where federal courts are unable or unwilling to do so.
C. A Case Study in Judicial Federalism: The U.S. Virgin Islands
That territorial courts may use territorial constitutional law to safeguard
individual rights and promote local autonomy and self-governance is not an
untested hypothetical. Over the last several years, one territorial court—the
Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands—has not only asserted its constitutional
powers but done so successfully despite significant opposition and interference,
including from the federal courts. Yet while these decisions often dealt with weighty
questions regarding federal-territorial relations and brought about substantial and
meaningful change in the U.S. Virgin Islands with the potential for similar change
elsewhere, they remain largely unknown to the greater legal community. This
section highlights these largely invisible cases to demonstrate both the viability of
territorial courts and territorial constitutional law as a means for effectuating
change in our federalist system.273
i. Constitutional Jurisdiction
The Case or Controversy Clause of Article III of the United States Constitution,
as it has been interpreted by the Supreme Court of the United States, establishes
significant constitutional limits on the subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal
273. Discerning readers may notice the failure to refer to the federalist relationship between the
federal courts and the courts of the five territories as “territorial federalism.” As alluded in the prior
section, the phrase “territorial federalism” has recently and regrettably been misappropriated to refer
to a proposed legal regime that is quite the opposite of federalism, where the territories voluntarily cede
equal rights and accept their second-class status in exchange for the federal courts applying higher levels
of scrutiny to congressional legislation relating to the territories. See Territorial Federalism, supra note
21, at 1653–54.
But even if writing on a blank slate, the use of the word “territorial” to modify “federalism”
necessarily implies that territorial federalism is somehow distinct or different from traditional concepts
of federalism to warrant use of this modifier. As the entirety of this Article has sought to demonstrate,
the relationship between federal courts and territorial courts is—or at least should be—completely
identical in every way to the relationship between federal courts and state courts. To characterize the
relationship between federal courts and territorial courts as “territorial federalism” would thus be akin
to analyzing “the law of the horse.” See generally Frank H. Easterbrook, Cyberspace and the Law of the
Horse, 1996 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 207 (1996). This is unlike the study of “territorial constitutional law,” which,
as this Article has hopefully demonstrated, departs in many significant ways from both federal
constitutional law and state constitutional law.
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courts, to wit, that a federal court cannot issue an advisory opinion, and that a party
must have standing to sue.274 While ostensibly “built on a single basic idea—the
idea of separation of powers,”275 as a practical matter the federal courts frequently
utilize Article III as “an ingenious mechanism to avoid declaring statutes
unconstitutional” or to otherwise avoid issuing controversial decisions. 276 In other
words, the federal courts often invoke “jurisdictional or justiciability principles to
avoid deciding a case on its merits,” particularly cases which may be viewed as
“political.”277 As a result, certain provisions of the United States Constitution have
become “effectively unenforceable” due to the refusal of the federal courts to
adjudicate disputes which implicate them. 278 Such “[p]olitical monasticism”
ultimately “works against the disadvantaged and powerless classes” by making it
exceptionally difficult to use the federal courts as a means to vindicate civil rights.279
Like the rest of Article III, however, the Case or Controversy Clause applies
only to the federal courts; as with other laws, “[s]tates have developed their own
justiciability rules defining the authority of their judiciaries.” 280 While some states
have essentially adopted the federal doctrines of standing, mootness, and ripeness,
“[o]ther states allow greater access to their courts than is available under the
federal doctrines,” with “[t]hose latter states hav[ing] . . . establish[ed] a broader
role for the courts in their governmental system.” 281 In fact, some states have
concluded that these doctrines are “not jurisdictional at all” and can be waived by
the parties or by the courts.282 Importantly, the Supreme Court of the United States
has held that state supreme courts are not required to apply federal standing law
or other federal jurisdictional doctrines even in cases where a party has brought a
federal cause of action in state court.283
274. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
275. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 752 (1984).
276. Laveta Casdorph, The Constitution and Reconstitution of the Standing Doctrine, 30 ST. MARY’S
L.J. 471, 546 (1999); see also Heather Elliott, Balancing as Well as Separating Power: Congress’s Authority
to Recognize New Legal Rights, 68 VAND. L. REV. EN BANC 181, 181 (2015).
277. Laura A. Smith, Justiciability and Judicial Discretion: Standing at the Forefront of Judicial
Abdication, 61 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1548, 1549 (1993).
278. Clark D. Cunningham, After Grutter Things Get Interesting! The American Debate Over
Affirmative Action is Finally Ready for Some Fresh Ideas from Abroad, 36 CONN. L. REV. 665, 665 (2004).
279. Nancy Levit, The Caseload Conundrum, Constitutional Restraint and the Manipulation of
Jurisdiction, 64 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 321, 363–64 (1989).
280. F. Andrew Hessick, Cases, Controversies, and Diversity, 109 NW. U. L. REV. 57, 65 (2014).
281. Id.
282. See, e.g., Chubb Lloyds Ins. Co. v. Miller Cnty. Cir. Ct., 361 S.W.3d 809, 815 (Ark. 2010)
(“[S]tanding is not a component of subject-matter jurisdiction . . . .”); Lebron v. Gottlieb Mem’l Hosp.,
930 N.E.2d 895, 916 (Ill. 2010) (“[L]ack of standing is an affirmative defense . . . .”); Harrison v. Leach,
323 S.W.3d 702, 707–08 (Ky. 2010) (“[A] trial court’s subject-matter jurisdiction is distinct from
standing . . . .”); see also Hessick, supra note 280, at 65–72; Patrick W. Maraist, A Statutory Beacon in
the Land Use Ripeness Maze: The Florida Private Property Rights Protection Act, 47 FLA. L. REV. 411, 419
n.40 (1995) (“[S]tate courts apply ripeness . . . under prudential concerns.”).
283. ASARCO Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 617–18 (1989).
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As a technical matter, the United States District Court of the Virgin Islands,
like most other district courts in the territories, is not an Article III court, but an
Article IV court.284 Nevertheless, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit has held that Congress intended for the Case or Controversy Clause to apply
to cases brought in that court, based on the premise that Congress vested it with
the authority to exercise “the jurisdiction of a District Court of the United States”285
which is limited to only adjudicating cases or controversies.286 As a result, the
District Court of the Virgin Islands, like its Article III counterparts, routinely
dismisses cases that raise serious federal and local constitutional issues for lack of
standing.287
The territorial courts of the U.S. Virgin Islands, however, have chosen a
different path. In its earliest decisions, the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands
initially followed the Third Circuit and the District Court in both applying the Case
or Controversy Clause to the territorial court system and treating it as
jurisdictional.288 It quickly retreated from that position, holding that the Revised
Organic Act of 1954 did not extend Article III to the local courts of the U.S. Virgin
Islands or impose a similar limitation on the jurisdiction of the territorial courts, and
that concepts such as standing, ripeness, and mootness are not jurisdictional, but
are therefore at best claims-processing rules subject to waiver by the parties or the
court.289 While not invoked in the decisions embracing this principle, this approach
has a textual basis in the Virgin Islands Bill of Rights in the Revised Organic Act,
which provides that “[n]o law shall be passed abridging . . . the right of the people .
. . to . . . petition the government for the redress of grievances.”290 This rejection of
federal jurisdictional concepts, when combined with an exceptionally broad
taxpayer suit statute adopted by the Virgin Islands Legislature,291 effectively permits
any citizen to obtain meaningful redress in the territorial courts for any violation of
any right—whether federal or territorial; constitutional or statutory—by the
government of the Virgin Islands or any of its officers, employees, or agents.292
It is unnecessary to create hypotheticals to illustrate the practical effects of
this decision. For example, during the 2014 gubernatorial election, a citizen who
sought to challenge the eligibility of a candidate for lieutenant governor to serve in
that position if elected initially filed his lawsuit in the United States District Court of
the Virgin Islands on August 18, 2014. 293 The district court dismissed the citizen’s
284. Am. Ins. Co. v. 356 Bales of Cotton, 26 U.S. (1 Pet.) 511, 512 (1828).
285. 48 U.S.C. § 1612(a).
286. Russell v. DeJongh, 491 F.3d 130, 133, n.3 (3d Cir. 2007).
287. See, e.g., Legislature of the V.I. v. DeJongh, 645 F. Supp. 2d 452 (D.V.I. App. Div. 2009); Bryan
v. Turnbull, 291 F. Supp. 2d 386 (D.V.I. 2003).
288. See, e.g., Arlington Funding Servs., Inc. v. Geigel, 51 V.I. 118, 125–26 (V.I. 2009).
289. See, e.g., Benjamin v. AIG Ins. Co. of P.R., 56 V.I. 558, 564–65 (V.I. 2012); Farrell v. People, 54
V.I. 600, 607–08 (V.I. 2011); Vazquez v. Vazquez, 54 V.I. 485, 489 n.1 (V.I. 2010).
290. 48 U.S.C. § 1561.
291. V.I. CODE ANN. tit. 5, § 80 (2021).
292. See V.I. Taxi Ass’n v. W. Indian Co., 66 V.I. 473, 483–84 (V.I. 2017).
293. Haynes v. Ottley, No. 2014-70, 2014 WL 5469308 (D.V.I. Oct. 28, 2014).
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complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction based on an inability to establish
Article III standing.294 Rather than appeal that decision to the Third Circuit, the
citizen re-filed his complaint in the Superior Court of the Virgin Islands, which held
that it was not necessary for the citizen to establish Article III standing, but that the
taxpayer statute did not authorize the challenge. 295 In an appeal decided after the
challenged candidate had already lost the election, the Supreme Court of the Virgin
Islands declined to dismiss the case as moot due to the public importance of the
question presented, and proceeded to reverse the Superior Court’s decision,
holding that the taxpayer statute authorized the challenge, and to hold otherwise
would “deprive Virgin Islands voters of their right to vote for an eligible combined
governor / lieutenant governor ticket.”296
ii. Relations Between Territorial and Federal Courts
The legal relationship between the federal courts and the courts of the fifty
states is well established. The interpretation of state laws, including state
constitutions, by state supreme courts is unreviewable even by the Supreme Court
of the United States.297 State courts are not bound by decisions of the lower federal
courts interpreting federal law and are certainly not bound by decisions of the lower
federal courts applying state law.298 Rather, state courts are only bound to follow

294. Id.
295. Haynes v. Ottley, 61 V.I. 547, 556–57 (V.I. 2014).
296. Id. at 575.
297. See, e.g., Murdock v. City of Memphis, 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 590 (1874); Herb v. Pitcairn, 324
U.S. 117, 125–26 (1945); Black v. Cutter Lab’ys, 351 U.S. 292 (1956); Wilson v. Loew’s, Inc., 355 U.S. 597
(1958).
298. See, e.g., State v. Montano, 77 P.3d 1246, 1247 n.1 (Ariz. 2003) (finding the court was not
bound by the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of the United States Constitution); People v. Dunlap, 975 P.2d
723, 748 (Colo. 1999) (explaining that the court was not bound by the Tenth Circuit’s interpretation of
federal constitutional requirements); Stratos v. Dep’t of Pub. Welfare, 439 N.E.2d 778, 786 n.8 (Mass.
1982) (finding that although the calculation of an award under § 1988 was governed by federal law, the
court was not bound to follow the method adopted by the First Circuit); Cash Distrib. Co. v. Neely, 947
So. 2d 286, 294 (Miss. 2007) (“While this Court often defers to Fifth Circuit decisions interpreting federal
law, we are under no obligation to do so.”); State v. Robinson, 82 P.3d 27, 30 (Mont. 2003) (refusing to
follow the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of federal law, stating that the Courts of Appeals “do not have
appellate jurisdiction over the state courts and their decisions are not conclusive on state courts, even
on questions of federal law”); In re Lincoln Elec. Sys. v. Neb. Pub. Serv. Comm'n, 655 N.W.2d 363, 371
(Neb. 2003) (noting that while state courts are bound by the United States Supreme Court's
interpretation of federal law, they are not bound by circuit courts' interpretations); Commonwealth v.
Cross, 726 A.2d 333, 338 n.4 (Pa. 1999) (holding that the court was not bound by the Third Circuit
decisions interpreting United States Supreme Court jurisprudence); Lundborg v. Keystone Shipping Co.,
981 P.2d 854, 862–63 (Wash. 1999) (refusing to follow the Ninth Circuit's interpretation of a federal
maritime law issue).
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decisions of the Supreme Court of the United States to the extent they interpret
federal law.299
But even though “state supreme courts are coordinate (not inferior) to the
federal courts of appeals on matters of federal law” and thus “have no obligation
to harmonize their interpretative choices with the decision of their local federal
courts of appeals,”300 this theory does not always align with actual practice. “A few
state courts appear to believe that they are bound to follow the decisions of the
federal courts of appeals on questions of federal law, and many others have issued
inconsistent opinions on that question.”301 Moreover, several federal courts of
appeals have themselves declared that state courts are or should be bound by their
decisions.302 Additionally, federal courts often pay lip service to deferring to state
courts but actually do not do so, instead applying federal rules of statutory
construction and other federal doctrines to interpret state laws in a manner that
essentially perpetuates the status quo or homogenizes the law,303 even when doing
so is squarely at odds with state rules of statutory construction. 304 The practical
effect of this, besides “encourag[ing] forum shopping,” is “the stagnation of statelaw development because the federal court’s narrow decision is not reviewable by
the state’s high court” and by the time a similar case works its way through the
state system the costs to the state supreme court in rejecting the federal
interpretation of the state law would be highly disruptive due to litigants’ reliance
on it.305

299. See Three Affiliated Tribes of Fort Berthold Rsrv. v. Wold Eng’g, P.C., 467 U.S. 138, 156–58
(1984).
300. Abbe R. Gluck, Intersystemic Statutory Interpretation: Methodology as “Law” and the Erie
Doctrine, 120 YALE L.J. 1898, 1904 (2011).
301. Amanda Frost, Inferiority Complex: Should State Courts Follow Lower Federal Court Precedent
on the Meaning of Federal Law?, 68 VAND. L. REV. 53, 56 (2015).
302. See, e.g., Fretwell v. Lockhart, 946 F.2d 571, 577 (8th Cir. 1991) (assuming that an Arkansas
state trial court would be obligated to follow its precedent on a question of federal constitutional law),
rev'd on other grounds, 506 U.S. 364 (1993); Yniguez v. Arizona, 939 F.2d 727, 736 (9th Cir. 1991)
(“Despite the authorities that take the view that state courts are free to ignore decisions of the lower
federal courts on federal questions, we have serious doubts as to the wisdom of this view.”).
303. See, e.g., Mark C. Weber, Forum Allocation in Toxic Tort Cases: Lessons from the Tobacco
Litigation and Other Recent Developments, 26 WM. & MARY ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 93, 102–03 (2001)
(“[F]ederal judges tend to homogenize state law by citing to federal sources for the underlying law even
in diversity cases in which they should be applying the law a state court would apply to the case.”);
Douglas M. Branson, Collateral Participant Liability Under State Securities Laws, 19 PEPP. L. REV. 1027,
1065 (1992) (“Failure[] of federal judges to truly educate themselves about state law when sitting as an
Erie court . . . is documented.”); Note, Piercing the Corporate Law Veil: The Alter Ego Doctrine Under
Federal Common Law, 95 HARV. L. REV. 853, 856 n.18 (1982) (“In spite of the Erie doctrine, many diversity
cases have used federal alter ego standards rather than the applicable state law.”).
304. Gluck, supra note 300, at 1936–39.
305. Id. at 1939; Charles E. Clark, State Law in the Federal Courts: The Brooding Omnipresence of
Erie v. Tompkins, 55 YALE L.J. 267, 292–93 (1946).
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The territories are even more susceptible than the states to the
homogenization or improper construction of their local laws by the federal courts.
For instance, the U.S. Virgin Islands did not have a fully autonomous judicial
branch—where decisions of the territorial trial court would be appealed to a
territorial supreme court consisting of local justices appointed pursuant to local
law—until the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands assumed its jurisdiction in
2007.306 Rather, for much of its history, decisions of the Superior Court of the Virgin
Islands were appealable as of right to the United States District Court of the Virgin
Islands—sitting in a special capacity as an appellate tribunal—and then further
appealable as of right to the Third Circuit.307 The effect of this unusual arrangement
was that the Third Circuit served as the “de facto court of last resort for the Virgin
Islands” prior to 2007.308 During this period, the District Court and the Third Circuit
placed a federal gloss on many of the laws of the U.S. Virgin Islands, such as its
workers compensation statute, its civil rights act, and its novel statute abolishing
employment-at-will.309
The Third Circuit readily held after the establishment of the Supreme Court
of the Virgin Islands that it was no longer vested with the judicial power of the
territory, and that the District Court had likewise been divested of its former role in
shaping Virgin Islands jurisprudence. 310 Specifically, the Third Circuit stated that
“[g]oing forward,” the U.S. Virgin Islands would “begin developing indigenous
jurisprudence,” and that the federal courts would extend the Erie doctrine to the

306. See Hypolite v. People, 51 V.I. 97 (V.I. 2009) (summarizing the history of the Virgin Islands
court system).
307. See id.
308. Rawlins v. People, 61 V.I. 593, 610 n.10 (V.I. 2014). Particularly diligent readers may have
noticed that throughout this Article, citations to decisions of the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands
have departed from traditional Bluebook rule that “when a decision is rendered by the highest court in
a particular jurisdiction and the name of the reporter is the same as the name of that jurisdiction, neither
the name of the court nor the name of the state need be given.” THE BLUEBOOK: A UNIFORM SYSTEM OF
CITATION R. 10.4, at 106 (Columbia L. Rev. Ass’n et al. eds., 21st ed. 2020). The inclusion of “V.I.” in the
parenthetical following the citation to the Virgin Islands Reports is the style utilized in decisions of the
Supreme and Superior Courts of the Virgin Islands. See V.I.S.CT. I.O.P. App’x I § G. The reason for this
departure from the Bluebook rule is that the Virgin Islands Reports is not a publication created with the
assistance of or otherwise authorized by the Judicial Branch of the Virgin Islands, and that reporter has
published—and continues to publish—federal decisions as well, such as decisions of the United States
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit. The need for the Virgin Islands courts to require inclusion of “V.I.”
in citations to the Virgin Islands Supreme Court published in the Virgin Islands Reports is thus one of
many unfortunate side effects caused by the decades of influence of the Third Circuit and the District
Court of the Virgin Islands on the laws of the U.S. Virgin Islands.
309. See, e.g., Tavarez v. Klingensmith, 372 F.3d 188 (3d Cir. 2004); Miller v. V.I. Hous. Auth., 46
V.I. 623, 630–31 (D.V.I. 2005); Rajbahadoorsingh v. Chase Manhattan Bank, NA, 168 F. Supp. 2d 496
(D.V.I. 2001).
310. Edwards v. HOVENSA, LLC, 497 F.3d 355, 359 (3d Cir. 2007).
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U.S. Virgin Islands by being “required to predict how the Supreme Court of the
Virgin Islands would decide an issue of territorial law.”311
Unfortunately, this did not occur in practice. The District Court simply
disregarded certain precedents of the Virgin Islands Supreme Court, such as its
holding that the Federal Rules of Evidence did not apply to proceedings in the
Superior Court of the Virgin Islands312 and its seminal decision that title 1, section 4
of the Virgin Islands Code313 had been implicitly repealed in 2004. 314 Although the
Supreme Court of the United States has long recognized that territorial organic acts
constitute local law which does not form the basis for federal question jurisdiction,
the District Court and the Third Circuit continued to take the position that they
could exercise jurisdiction over any question implicating the Revised Organic Act of
1954 because of its purported status as a federal statute.
Surprisingly, this even included accepting jurisdiction to adjudicate issues
involving the internal operations of the Judicial Branch of the Virgin Islands based
purely on the Revised Organic Act and other territorial laws. In 2008 the District
Court declined to abstain from a case challenging the legality of the Virgin Islands
Commission on Judicial Disabilities and struck down the commission as violative not
of federal law but the Revised Organic Act, with the Third Circuit affirming both
aspects of that decision on appeal.315 Even as late as 2016, the District Court and
the Third Circuit both asserted jurisdiction over a dispute as to which superior court
judge possessed the authority to serve as presiding judge of that court—an issue
not even directly impacting the Revised Organic Act but relating only to local
statutes—again bypassing the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands entirely. 316
Significantly, in neither case did either the District Court or the Third Circuit make
any attempt to predict how the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands would interpret
the territorial laws at issue.317 And perhaps most egregiously, a panel of the Third
Circuit disregarded the plain language and intent of Public Law 112-226—which
terminated the temporary certiorari jurisdiction of the Third Circuit to review final
311. Id. at 361 n.3.
312. Compare Phillips v. People, 51 V.I. 258 (V.I. 2009) (holding that the statutory rules of
evidence codified in the Virgin Islands Code apply to the exclusion of the Federal Rules of Evidence), with
Thompson v. People, No. 2005-100, 2013 WL 5923653 (D.V.I. App. Div. Nov. 1, 2013) (applying the
Federal Rules of Evidence without any mention of Phillips), and Bellot v. Gov’t of the V.I., No. 2003-130,
2010 WL 3118660 (D.V.I. App. Div. July 30, 2010) (same).
313. 1 V.I.C. § 4 (“The rules of the common law, as expressed in the restatements of the law
approved by the American Law Institute, and to the extent not so expressed, as generally understood
and applied in the United States, shall be the rules of decision in the courts of the Virgin Islands in cases
to which they apply, in the absence of local laws to the contrary.”).
314. Compare Banks v. Int’l Rental & Leasing Corp., 55 V.I. 967 (V.I. 2011), and Gov’t of the V.I. v.
Connor, 60 V.I. 597 (V.I. 2014), with Dorval v. Fitzsimmons, Civ. No. 18-15, 2020 WL 376989 (D.V.I. Jan.
23, 2020) (citing 1 V.I.C. § 4 as authority despite its implicit repeal), and V.I. Taxi Ass’n v. V.I. Port Auth.,
Civ. No. 08-142, 2015 WL 5535237 (D.V.I. Sept. 16, 2015) (same).
315. Kendall v. Russell, 572 F.3d 126 (3d Cir. 2009).
316. Dunston v. Mapp, 672 Fed.Appx. 213 (3d Cir. 2016).
317. Id.
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judgments of the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands—and held that it could
continue to exercise such jurisdiction effectively indefinitely.318
The courts of the Virgin Islands, however, have vigorously asserted their
constitutional, statutory, and inherent authority despite this continued federal
encroachment. In one of its earliest decisions, the Supreme Court of the Virgin
Islands held that decisions of the District Court and the Third Circuit would not serve
as binding precedent.319 The Virgin Islands Supreme Court has declined to blindly
follow erroneous interpretations of territorial law adopted by the federal courts,
believing that the need to faithfully apply the laws enacted by the people of the
U.S. Virgin Islands through their elected representatives was of paramount
importance.320 Rather than homogenize territorial law with the rest of the United
States, it has not hesitated to adopt the best rule for the U.S. Virgin Islands, even
when doing so required it to reject federal practices or follow a minority rule. 321
And most recently, the Virgin Islands Supreme Court has recognized that the
Revised Organic Act constitutes territorial law and not federal law, and that it
possesses the authority as the highest court of the U.S. Virgin Islands to definitively
interpret the Virgin Islands Bill of Rights to provide greater protections than the
United States Constitution.322
Even with respect to perhaps the most direct encroachment on its authority—
the Third Circuit’s erroneous interpretation of Public Law 112-226—the Virgin
Islands Supreme Court actively asserted its rights through filing an amicus curiae
brief on rehearing.323 While unsuccessful in persuading the Third Circuit panel at
the time, the position of the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands would ultimately
carry the day, with the Virgin Islands Bar Association assuming the amicus curiae
mantel and successfully persuading the en banc Third Circuit to overturn the panel
decision in a subsequent case.324
Perhaps the most significant conflict between the federal and territorial
courts of the U.S. Virgin Islands occurred amid the 2014 election to the Legislature
of the Virgin Islands with respect to the eligibility of incumbent Senator Alicia
“Chucky” Hansen to hold that office. On appeal from the territorial trial court, the
Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands held that Senator Hansen did not meet the
qualifications for holding that office under the Virgin Islands Revised Organic Act,
which provides that “[n]o person shall be eligible to be a member of the legislature
. . . who has been convicted of a felony or of a crime involving moral turpitude and
has not received a pardon restoring his civil rights.”325 The Virgin Islands Supreme
318. United Indus., Serv., Transp., Pro. & Gov't Workers of N. Am. Seafarers Int'l Union ex rel.
Bason v. Gov't of the V.I., 767 F.3d 193, 200–01 (3d Cir. 2014).
319. In re People of the V.I., 51 V.I. 374, 389 n.9 (V.I. 2009).
320. See, e.g., Rennie v. Hess Oil V.I. Corp., 62 V.I. 529, 543–45 (V.I. 2015); Hodge v. Bluebeard’s
Castle, Inc., 62 V.I. 671, 676–77 (V.I. 2015); Defoe v. Phillip, 56 V.I. 109, 118–20 (V.I. 2012).
321. See, e.g., Antilles School, Inc. v. Lembach, 64 V.I. 400, 418–19 (V.I. 2016).
322. Balboni v. Ranger Am. of the V.I., Inc., 70 V.I. 1048, 1061 (V.I. 2019).
323. See Bason, 767 F.3d at 200 n.1.
324. Vooys v. Bentley, 901 F.3d 172, 173–75 (3d Cir. 2018) (en banc).
325. Bryan v. Fawkes, 61 V.I. 201, 239 (V.I. 2014); 48 U.S.C. § 1572(b).
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Court interpreted this provision as including Senator Hansen’s conviction for willful
failure to file an income tax return and ordered her stricken from the ballot. 326
The reasoning behind the territorial supreme court’s decision is itself highly
significant in that, in the process of interpreting the territorial organic act, the
territorial supreme court determined that it and not the District Court possessed
jurisdiction over the matter and declined to uncritically import several federally
created doctrines to the Virgin Islands court system, such as rejecting the political
question doctrine and Chevron deference.327 However, it is the series of events that
occurred after the territorial supreme court issued the decision that led some Virgin
Islands attorneys to identify the case as the territorial equivalent of Marbury v.
Madison.
Shortly after the Virgin Islands Supreme Court reached its decision, and while
a petition for rehearing remained pending with that court, Senator Hansen received
a pardon from the Governor of the Virgin Islands, thus restoring her civil rights. 328
Yet rather than await a ruling on the rehearing petition or otherwise ask for relief
from the Virgin Islands Supreme Court, Senator Hansen and five voters filed a
complaint in the District Court, requesting that she be placed back on the ballot. 329
Shockingly, the District Court exercised jurisdiction to grant this relief
notwithstanding ongoing litigation on the very same subject in the territorial court
system, and in effect created two contradictory judgments for the same disputed
question.330 After numerous proceedings in both the District Court and the
territorial courts, the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands issued a seminal opinion
holding that the District Court lacked jurisdiction to insert itself into the dispute,
that neither the Supremacy Clause nor any other provision of the United States
Constitution or other federal or territorial laws elevates decisions of the District
Court over those of the local courts—let alone on questions of local law—and
reaffirmed its earlier holding striking Senator Hansen from the ballot. 331
iii. Separation of Powers
Both territorial and federal courts agree that the Virgin Islands Revised
Organic Act of 1954, as the de facto constitution of the U.S. Virgin Islands, “implicitly
incorporate[s] the principle of separation of powers into the law of the territory.” 332
Nevertheless, for most of its history, the Judicial Branch of the U.S. Virgin Islands,
while nominally co-equal with the legislative and executive branches, lacked
substantial authority over its own affairs. This is because until the Virgin Islands
326. Bryan v. Fawkes, 61 V.I. 201, 239 (V.I. 2014).
327. See id. at 218–20, 218 n.6, 225.
328. Id.
329. Id.
330. Payne v. Fawkes, Civ. Nos. 2014–053, 055, 2014 WL 4499559, at *2 (D.V.I. Sept. 12, 2014)
(unpublished).
331. Bryan v. Fawkes, 61 V.I. 416, 437–38 (V.I. 2014).
332. Gerace v. Bentley, 65 V.I. 289, 301 (V.I. 2016) (quoting Kendall v. Russell, 572 F.3d 126, 135
(3d Cir. 2009)).
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Supreme Court assumed jurisdiction in 2007, “the Virgin Islands lacked a fully
developed local judiciary, with the District Court—a federal court established by
Congress rather than the Legislature and consisting of judges selected by the
President of the United States rather than the Governor of the Virgin Islands—
possessing jurisdiction over most civil actions, and local courts only exercising
jurisdiction over only relatively minor civil claims.”333 And “even though the Virgin
Islands local judiciary continued to expand and receive greater jurisdiction over
local matters in the decades that followed,” it remained a lesser branch of
government because prior to 2007 “all decisions rendered by the Superior Court
and its predecessor courts continued to be reviewed on appeal by the District Court,
which made it ‘very difficult to attain’ the goal of establishing ‘an indigenous Virgin
Islands jurisprudence’ given that local judges lacked the ability to issue decisions
that would constitute binding precedent in the territory.”334 In fact, the Virgin
Islands Judiciary could not even fully exercise the inherent authority to regulate
admission to the practice of law, since even the denial of a bar admissions decision
could be appealed as of right to the District Court, which asserted plenary review
over the subject.335
Unsurprisingly, the effect of the Virgin Islands Judiciary lacking meaningful
autonomy for the first ninety years under the United States flag led to usurpation
of many aspects of judicial power by other branches of government. Although
promulgation of the rules of general applicability governing practice within a court
system, such as rules of evidence and of civil and criminal procedure, are regarded
as an inherent power of a jurisdiction’s court of last resort,336 the Virgin Islands
Legislature codified numerous court rules as statutes in title 5 of the Virgin Islands
Code.337 While state and territorial court systems possess the inherent authority to
shape the common law within their jurisdiction, the Legislature enacted a statute
that, although bearing some resemblance to a reception statute, also provided that
the Restatements approved by the American Law Institute would serve as the laws
of the U.S. Virgin Islands in the absence of local laws to the contrary.338 And like the
District Court, the Legislature also inserted itself into attorney regulations, enacting
laws granting the Virgin Islands Department of Licensing and Consumer Affairs the
authority to license attorneys.339
The negative effects of these actions by the Legislature on the development
of Virgin Islands law cannot be overstated. As one scholar observed, “the wholesale
adoption of the Restatements might fairly be described as an invasion” and the
333. Banks v. Int’l Leasing & Rental Corp., 55 V.I. 967, 978 (V.I. 2011).
334. Id. (quoting BA Props. Inc. v. Gov’t of the United States Virgin Islands, 299 F.3d 207, 212 (3d
Cir. 2002)).
335. See, e.g., In re Application No. 00017, 50 V.I. 594, 595 (D.V.I. App. Div. 2008); In re Adornato,
301 F. Supp. 2d 416, 418–19 (D.V.I. App. Div. 2004).
336. Gerace, 65 V.I. at 304–05 (collecting cases).
337. See, e.g., 5 V.I.C. §§ 1–590 (civil procedure); 5 V.I.C. §§ 651–956 (evidence); 5 V.I.C. §§ 3501–
4645 (criminal procedure).
338. 1 V.I.C. § 4.
339. Smith v. Magras, 124 F.3d 457, 466 (3d Cir. 1997).
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resulting “interruption of the normal common-lawmaking process may actually be
affirmatively harmful” to the U.S. Virgin Islands.340 Rather than clarify the common
law or provide for a uniform starting point for its development, courts “struggled”
with applying it, resulting in significant litigation focused not on determining the
best rule for the U.S. Virgin Islands, but on deciding collateral issues such as whether
a tentative draft of a Restatement is binding or whether a new Restatement erases
prior decisions applying an older Restatement.341 Similarly, the statutory
codification of court procedures—which were then rarely revisited after their initial
enactment—did not serve to simplify court proceedings, but created significant
uncertainty and litigation over what procedures governed, with courts issuing
highly contradictory rulings on the question.342 Likewise, the patchwork of rules and
statutes governing admission to the Virgin Islands Bar, as well as differing courts
purporting to exercise plenary authority over admission decisions, resulted in
substantial confusion over what would ordinarily be a simple question—whether
someone is or is not licensed to practice law in the U.S. Virgin Islands—some of
which continues to persist even to this day.
As it did with federal precedents erroneously interpreting territorial law, the
Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands declined to take the path of least resistance and
permit these practices to stand. The Virgin Islands Supreme Court recognized that
under the Revised Organic Act—the de facto Constitution of the U.S. Virgin
Islands—it possessed the authority to determine the common law, and that the
Legislature did not “possess[] the authority to adopt a statute which not completely
deprives this Court of the ability to exercise its supreme judicial power to shape the
common law, but delegates that power to the American Law Institute and to the
governments of other jurisdictions.”343 While acknowledging that the Legislature
could adopt some court procedures through statutes, it emphasized that its
authority to do so was concurrent with that of the Virgin Islands Supreme Court,
and “that conflicts between rules promulgated by the judiciary and rules
promulgated by the legislature are resolved in favor of the judiciary.” 344 And last,
while certainly not least, the Virgin Islands Supreme Court vigorously asserted its
inherent authority over regulation of the legal profession, including enforcing the
prohibition on the unauthorized practice of law even against high-level government
attorneys.345

340. Kristen David Adams, The Folly of Uniformity? Lessons From the Restatement Movement, 33
HOFSTRA L. REV. 423, 456–57 (2004).
341. See, e.g., In re Manbodh Asbestos Litig. Series, 47 V.I. 215, 225–26 (V.I. Super. Ct. 2005); see
also Joseph T. Gasper, Too Big to Fail: Banks and the Reception of the Common Law in the U.S. Virgin
Islands, 46 STETSON L. REV. 295, 337–44 (2016).
342. See, e.g., Gov’t of the V.I. v. Greenridge, 41 V.I. 200, 208 n.5 (D.V.I. App. Div. 1998); Gov’t of
the V.I. v. Sampson, 42 V.I. 247, 261 n.8 (D.V.I. App. Div. 2000); Enfield Green Homeowners Ass’n v.
Francis, 46 V.I. 332, 337 n.4 (D.V.I. App. Div. 2004).
343. Banks v. Int’l Rental & Leasing Corp., 55 V.I. 967, 980 (2011).
344. Gerace, 65 V.I. at 302–03.
345. See, e.g., In re Campbell, 59 V.I. 701, 709 (V.I. 2013).
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IV. THE UNTAPPED POTENTIAL OF TERRITORIAL CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
As the above cases illustrate, territorial courts—and particularly the courts
of the Virgin Islands—have not hesitated to exercise the full extent of their
constitutional, statutory, and inherent authority, even in instances when doing so
may be controversial or result in an uncertain outcome. In doing so, such courts
have also not shied away from declining to incorporate unrelated federal laws into
the jurisprudence of the territory. But what does this mean for the future of the
nascent field of territorial constitutional law, and public interest litigation to secure
the rights and liberties of the people of the territories?
While it may be cliché to say, the possibilities are truly endless. One need only
look to how state supreme courts have interpreted state constitutions—including
provisions with similar or identical language to provisions of the federal bill of
rights—to imagine the sorts of protections for individual rights and liberties that a
territorial supreme court could enact through interpretation of its territorial
constitution or organic act. This includes, but is not necessarily limited to, more
robust equal protection and due process guarantees;346 a fundamental right to
education;347 or even a right to be forgotten.348
Territorial legislatures, however, are not the source of most frustrations about
the legal rights of the territories and their people. Rather, the issues that have
drawn the most attention from both public interest litigators and the media in
recent years are of a seemingly federal nature. 349 Yet it is well established that the
federal government is not bound by state laws—including state constitutions—
unless it voluntarily acquiesces to such laws.350 How, then, can territorial
constitutions and organic acts play any role in ensuring that the people of the
territories receive equal treatment vis-à-vis the federal government?
As a threshold matter, the federal government has in fact bound itself to the
bill of rights provisions in the territorial organic acts of the U.S. Virgin Islands and
Guam, at least in part. As the Supreme Court of the United States recognized in
Limtiaco,351 territorial organic acts often are hybrid documents in which some
provisions may represent Congress acting in its capacity as a national legislature
even if most of the legislation is directed only to a single territory.352 This is the case
with the last sentence of the Virgin Islands Bill of Rights, codified in the Virgin Islands
Revised Organic Act through the 1968 amendments, which provides, in its entirety,
as follows:

346. See Balboni v. Ranger Am. of the V.I., Inc., 70 V.I. 1048, 1067–68 (2019).
347. See, e.g., Horton v. Meskill, 376 A.2d 359, 373 (Conn. 1977).
348. See John W. Dowdell, An American Right to be Forgotten, 52 TULSA L. REV. 311 (2017).
349. See, e.g., Tuaua v. United States, 788 F.3d 300 (D.C. Cir. 2015) (citizenship).
350. See, e.g., U.S. Dep't of Energy v. Ohio, 503 U.S. 607 (1992); Dalehite v. United States, 346
U.S. 15 (1953); United States v. Summerlin, 310 U.S. 414, 417 (1940); United States v. Reid, 53 U.S. 361
(1851).
351. Limtiaco v. Camacho, 549 U.S. 483, 491–92 (2007).
352. Id.
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All laws enacted by Congress with respect to the Virgin Islands and all
laws enacted by the territorial legislature of the Virgin Islands which are
inconsistent with the provisions of this subsection are repealed to the
extent of such inconsistency.353
The Bill of Rights provision included in the Organic Act of Guam contains
virtually identical language.354 The subsection containing this provision does not
just include many enumerated rights, but also incorporates numerous provisions of
the United States Constitution by reference—including “the first to ninth
amendments inclusive; the thirteenth amendment; the second sentence of section
1 of the fourteenth amendment; and the fifteenth and nineteenth amendments”—
which “shall have the same force and effect [in the U.S. Virgin Islands] as in the
United States or in any State of the United States.” 355
Despite the extraordinary breadth of its language, this clause has received
scant attention from litigants and courts. In fact, it appears that only one court has
had an opportunity to construe it. In Government of the Virgin Islands v. Ortiz,356
the United States Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit considered whether this
repealer clause had repealed the federal Bail Reform Act as it pertained to the
United States District Court of the Virgin Islands, given that the Bail Reform Act
contained provisions inconsistent with one of the enumerated provisions in the
Virgin Islands Bill of Rights providing that “[a]ll persons shall be bailable by sufficient
sureties in the case of criminal offenses, except for first-degree murder or any
capital offense when the proof is evident or the presumption great.”357 Somewhat
surprisingly, it was the federal government which argued that the repealer clause
had repealed the pertinent provisions of the Bail Reform Act. 358 Ultimately, the
Third Circuit adopted a narrow construction of the repealer clause, and effectively
engaged in judicial rewriting of the statute to construe the word “subsection” as
“paragraph” to conclude “that Congress intended . . . that the repealer clause in the
amendment to section 1561 should apply only to laws inconsistent with the
constitutional provisions extended to the Virgin Islands by the same amendment,
and not to laws inconsistent with other antecedent provisions of section 1561.”359
Since the Third Circuit by its own admission interpreted the repealer clause
in a manner directly contrary to its plain text, its holding that Congress did not
repeal laws contrary to the enumerated provisions of the Virgin Islands Bill of Rights
is inherently questionable.360 In fact, the territorial courts of the U.S. Virgin Islands
353. 48 U.S.C. § 1561.
354. 48 U.S.C. § 1421b.
355. 48 U.S.C. § 1561.
356. Gov’t of the Virgin Islands v. Ortiz, 427 F.2d 1043 (3d Cir. 1970).
357. Id. at 1045 (quoting 48 U.S.C. § 1561).
358. See id. at 1045–46
359. Ortiz, 427 F.2d at 1046.
360. In fact, the Ortiz court, perhaps recognizing this questionable reasoning, ultimately resolved
its case by extending the federal Bail Reform Act to prosecutions in the United States District Court of
the Virgin Islands pursuant to its supervisory powers. Id. at 1048.
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have declined to treat the Ortiz decision as binding, and have held that the federal
Bail Reform Act does not apply to prosecutions in the territorial courts.361
Nevertheless, the Third Circuit expressly and unambiguously held in Ortiz that the
repealer clause served to repeal all federal laws applicable to the U.S. Virgin Islands
inconsistent with “the first to ninth amendments inclusive; the thirteenth
amendment; the second sentence of section 1 of the fourteenth amendment; and
the fifteenth and nineteenth amendments,” with those provisions “hav[ing] the
same force and effect [in the U.S. Virgin Islands] as in the United States or in any
State of the United States.”362
The profound effect of even such a highly limited interpretation of the
repealer clause of the Virgin Islands Bill of Rights cannot be understated. At an
absolute minimum, it means that all federal laws that exclude the U.S. Virgin Islands
from federal assistance programs or provide lesser benefits to residents of the U.S.
Virgin Islands than residents of the fifty states,363 are invalid. This is not because the
United States Constitution compels this result, even though that may very well be
the case.364 Rather, it is because Congress voluntarily chose to treat the U.S. Virgin
Islands in the same manner as if it were a state for purposes of the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, and voluntarily elected to repeal all federal
laws pertaining to the U.S. Virgin Islands that would be inconsistent with such
treatment. That Congress intended for the federal government to be bound as this
may further explain its otherwise curious decision to not expressly extend the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution to the U.S. Virgin Islands.365
But the existence of a repealer clause or other congressional action
binding the federal government to the provisions of a territorial constitution or
organic act, while certainly helpful, is not a prerequisite to the use of territorial
constitutional law to safeguard federal rights. It is certainly true that courts have
consistently held that the federal government is not bound by the provisions of
territorial laws without its consent.366 However, the United States government is
not the only entity within our federalist system that possesses an obligation to
follow the United States Constitution. Many rights, while certainly federal in nature,
are in practice implemented by state and territorial governments. Although the
right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizures is a federal right
safeguarded by the Fourth Amendment to the United States Constitution, the right
is rarely enforced by directly suing the federal government; rather, most Fourth
361. See, e.g., Browne v. People, 50 V.I. 241, 253 (2008); People v. Dowdye, 48 V.I. 45, 59–68 (V.I.
Super. Ct. 2006).
362. 48 U.S.C. § 1561.
363. For a summary of some of these programs, see DISABILITY RIGHTS CENTER OF THE V.I., SHADOW
CITIZENS:
CONFRONTING
FEDERAL
DISCRIMINATION
IN
THE
U.S.
VIRGIN
ISLANDS,
https://www.drcvi.org/documents/general/DRCVI-ShadownCitizens.pdf?downloadable=1.
364. See United States v. Vaello-Madero, 956 F.3d 12 (1st Cir. 2020).
365. See People v. Clark, 53 V.I. 183, 195–96 (V.I. Super. Ct. 2010) (holding that the Supremacy
Clause has not been extended to the U.S. Virgin Islands).
366. See, e.g., United States v. Acosta Martinez, 252 F.3d 13 (1st Cir. 2001); United States v.
Quinones, 758 F.2d 40 (1st Cir. 1985); United States v. Lebron-Caceres, 157 F. Supp. 3d 80 (D.P.R. 2016).
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Amendment law is developed in individual criminal cases, including cases in state
and territorial courts where the United States is not a party. While United States
citizenship is a federal right, state and territorial laws often restrict the right to vote
in local elections to United States citizens, which requires state and territorial
officials to determine if an individual is in fact a citizen. And although federal law
establishes minimum standards for absentee voting by military and overseas
voters, it is ultimately the responsibility of states and territories to apply those
standards in the elections they oversee.
That territorial governments themselves are required to implement
federal statutes or otherwise determine the existence of a federal right provides
significant opportunities to utilize territorial constitutional law, both directly and
indirectly. For example, although the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit has extended the international border search exception of the Fourth
Amendment to permit warrantless searches of passengers and goods entering and
leaving the U.S. Virgin Islands,367 the territorial courts of the U.S. Virgin Islands could
interpret the search and seizure provisions of the Virgin Islands Bill of Rights to
preclude the use of evidence obtained during such searches. Even if such a ruling
were limited only to local prosecutions—which may not necessarily be the case in
light of the repealer clause of the Virgin Islands Bill of Rights—such a decision may
nevertheless modify the behavior of law enforcement officers so as to avoid
evidence potentially being suppressed in local prosecutions. While challenges to
the constitutionality of discriminatory federal statutes relating to voting rights that
have been dismissed for lack of Article III standing in the federal courts—such as
the constitutionality of the oversees voting provisions in the Uniformed and
Overseas Absentee Voting Act as applied to Guam, Puerto Rico, and the U.S. Virgin
Islands368—could be heard on the merits in territorial courts, since concepts such
as standing, ripeness, and mootness, while jurisdictional in the federal courts, are
often not jurisdictional in territorial courts due to territorial constitutions and
organic acts containing different language than the Cases and Controversies Clause
of the United States Constitution. Although the scope of such a decision would only
apply to elections in the U.S. Virgin Islands, the existence of a decision declaring a
federal statute unconstitutional substantially increases the likelihood of review by
the Supreme Court of the United States, which would have the potential to then set
a nationwide precedent.
Last, but certainly not least, the creation of a highly robust body of
territorial constitutional law developed by territorial courts is critically necessary to
further the development of federal constitutional law, particularly as it relates to
the rights of territorial governments and their peoples. It is clear that “state courts,
through their interpretation of state constitutional provisions, can contribute to the

367. See, e.g., United States v. Baxter, 951 F.3d 128 (3d Cir. 2020); United States v. Hyde, 37 F.3d
116 (3d Cir. 1994).
368. See, e.g., Segovia v. United States, 880 F.3d 384 (7th Cir. 2018).
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safeguards of American federalism.”369 Throughout our nation’s history, “state
court decisions have shaped federal law in the areas of judicial review, substantive
due process, freedom of speech and religion, eminent domain, the right to bear
arms, and the rights of the accused.”370 This is particularly true in areas involving
“social and economic rights,” where state court decisions serve to indirectly
“reorient federal constitutional doctrine” by “creat[ing] new understandings that
‘presage’ federal constitutional rights” ultimately recognized by the United States
Supreme Court.371 In other words, it is an underappreciated yet “essential
constitutional function of state courts to engage federal courts in a dialogue about
the scope of federally created rights.”372
The influence of state courts on federal constitutional law has most recently
been seen in the case of same-sex marriage. In an approximately 40-year period the
Supreme Court of the United States shifted from holding in Baker v. Nelson that the
exclusion of same-sex couples from marriage did not present a substantial federal
question373 to determining in Obergefell v. Hodges that inclusion of same-sex
couples in the institution of marriage is constitutionally mandated.374 This
watershed change was facilitated by a series of state supreme court decisions
finding such rights in their state constitutions,375 which influenced the lower federal
courts to take the rare step of in effect overturning.
The underdevelopment of territorial constitutional law over the past century
has certainly contributed to the present status quo, where the lower federal courts
continue to apply a bastardized misinterpretation of the Insular Cases to permit
Congress to exercise plenary authority over the territories. Changes to federal
constitutional law because of the ongoing dialogue between state supreme courts
and the federal courts remains possible only because state supreme courts are not
subservient or lower than the federal courts of appeals. This “dialectical federalism”
successfully operates because the “courts [a]re required both to speak and listen as
equals,” engaging in an “open-ended dialogue [which] becomes the driving force
for the articulation of rights,” to be ultimately resolved by the United States
Supreme Court.376 Yet until relatively recently, territorial courts did not serve as the
369. John Dinan, State Constitutional Amendment Processes and the Safeguards of American
Federalism, 115 PENN ST. L. REV. 1007 (2011) (citing JAMES A. GARDNER, INTERPRETING STATE CONSTITUTIONS: A
JURISPRUDENCE OF FUNCTION IN A FEDERAL SYSTEM (2005)).
370. Robert F. Utter, Swimming in the Jaws of the Crocodile: State Court Comment on Federal
Constitutional Issues When Disposing of Cases on State Constitutional Grounds, 63 TEX. L. REV. 1025, 1030
(1985) (collecting cases).
371. Helen Hershkoff, “Just Words”: Common Law and the Enforcement of State Constitutional
Social and Economic Rights, 62 STAN. L. REV. 1521, 1530–31 (2010).
372. Jay Tidmarsh, A Dialogic Defense of Alden, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1161, 1167-68 (2000).
373. Baker v. Nelson, 409 U.S. 810 (1972), overruled by Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015).
374. Obergefell v. Hodges, 576 U.S. 644 (2015).
375. See, e.g., Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993); Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798
N.E.2d 941 (Mass. 2003).
376. Harry L. Witte, Rights, Revolution, and the Paradox of Constitutionalism: The Processes of
Constitutional Change in Pennsylvania, 3 WIDENER J. PUB. L. 383, 421 (1993) (internal citations omitted).
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equals of the lower federal courts, in that for much of the past century the lower
federal courts possessed appellate jurisdiction over even the highest court of a
territory, in effect preventing the territories from developing their own indigenous
jurisprudence to push-back against more restrictive interpretations of the United
States Constitution.377
Today, the territorial supreme courts of all five territories are fully
independent of the federal courts—or at least as independent as the supreme
courts of the fifty states. And as summarized earlier, these territorial supreme
courts—and the Supreme Court of the Virgin Islands in particular—have initiated
dialogues with the lower federal courts on several important issues of both
territorial and federal constitutional magnitude.378 As territorial courts and federal
courts continue to engage with each other as equals, with territorial courts utilizing
territorial constitutional law to provide the protections that the federal courts have
been unwilling to give, the result will at an absolute minimum be a more coherent
and thoughtful body of the law of the territories, developed and refined by
reasoned analysis rather than blind reliance on the Insular Cases.
V. CONCLUSION
The local courts of the five inhabited United States territories, as well as
the judicial officers that serve on them, have accomplished much over a relatively
short period of time. Despite continued challenges to their legitimacy and authority
vis-à-vis the federal courts and other institutions, these territorial courts have
established mature legal systems and a robust body of jurisprudence, including
interpretation of their territorial constitutions and organic acts. Yet the work of
these territorial courts remains overlooked even by those who believe that the
courts must play a key role in ensuring equal rights for their territories and their
people. Modern territorial courts not only possess the authority to develop their
own body of binding territorial constitutional law, free of federal review, but have
demonstrated time and time again that they will exercise this power if given the
chance in appropriate cases.
It is difficult to predict with any certainty how the relationship between the
United States and these five territories will develop over the next several decades.
But as this Article has hopefully demonstrated, territorial constitutional law has the
potential to play an important role in shaping that relationship, particularly in the
face of a federal judiciary that is indifferent or even hostile to the rights of the
territories and their people. While territorial courts have indicated their willingness
to utilize territorial constitutional law to vindicate such rights, the future of
territorial constitutional law will ultimately depend on whether territorial
governments, territorial rights activists, and their attorneys choose to accept their
invitation.

377. See, e.g., Guam v. Guerrero, 290 F.3d 1210 (9th Cir. 2002).
378. See discussion supra Part III.C.

